

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

2024



Cluster
Munition
Coalition

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2024

15th ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Research team leaders • ICBL-CMC experts

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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by publishing all of our research products online. This report and detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org.¹

CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions and prevent further harm from these weapons. The CMC works through its members to change the policy and practice of governments and organizations and to raise awareness of the devastation that cluster munitions cause.

The CMC is committed to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions and for destroying stockpiles, clearing contaminated areas, and assisting affected communities.

The CMC calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of cluster munitions;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants in cluster munition-contaminated areas; and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all cluster munition and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims.

¹ Archived Monitor country profiles for the period 2010-2022 are available at bit.ly/MonitorArchives2; and archived Monitor country profiles for the period 1999-2014 are available at bit.ly/MonitorArchives1.

PREFACE

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions pose significant dangers to civilians for two principal reasons: their impact at the time of use and their deadly legacy. Launched from the ground or dropped from the air, cluster munitions consist of containers that open and disperse submunitions indiscriminately over a wide area, claiming both civilian and military victims. Many explosive submunitions and bomblets fail to detonate as designed when they are dispersed, becoming *de facto* landmines that kill and maim indiscriminately long after the conflict has ended and create barriers to socio-economic development.

To protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions, Norway and a number of like-minded countries initiated a fast-track diplomatic process in late 2006 aimed at creating a new international treaty. Working in partnership with United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and civil society organizations grouped under the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the Oslo Process resulted in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008, which opened for signature on 3 December 2008.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010. It comprehensively prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. It also requires destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years, clearance of cluster munition remnants within 10 years, and assistance to victims, including those injured by submunitions as well as the families of those injured or killed, and affected communities.

The convention's First Meeting of States Parties was held in November 2010 in Lao PDR—the country with the highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions. States Parties adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a 66-point action plan to guide their work until the convention's First Review Conference. The 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan and the 2021 Lausanne Action Plan were respectively adopted at the first and second review conferences, listing concrete steps to further implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the periods from 2015 to 2020 and from 2021 to 2026.

CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

Launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in November 2003, the CMC plays a crucial and ongoing facilitating role in leading global civil society action in favor of the ban on cluster munitions. With campaign contacts in more than 100 countries, the CMC works for the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In January 2011, the CMC merged with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and ICBL remain two distinct campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munion Monitor provides research and monitoring for both the CMC and ICBL, on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty respectively. Created by the ICBL as Landmine Monitor in June 1998, the initiative became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC in 2008 and changed its name in 2010 to Landmine and Cluster Munion Monitor, known simply as “the Monitor.”

The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and report on problems. Established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation, the Monitor has put into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts. It has become the *de facto* monitoring regime for both treaties, monitoring and reporting on States Parties’ implementation and compliance, and more generally, assessing the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor’s reporting complements transparency reporting by States Parties required under the treaties, and reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable for the legal obligations that they have accepted with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive data collection and analysis of publicly available information, including via field missions in some instances. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring in order to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC’s research and monitoring, including all Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Project Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all Monitor research products. To prepare this report, an Editorial Team gathered information with the aid of a global reporting network comprised of more than a dozen researchers, with the assistance of CMC campaigners.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were carried out by the Monitor.

The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought in the spirit of dialogue and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on this important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 15th annual *Cluster Munition Monitor* report. It is the sister publication to the *Landmine Monitor* report, which has been issued annually since 1999.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2024 covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally; and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. While its principal frame of reference is the Convention on Cluster Munitions, other relevant international law is reviewed, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The report focuses on the calendar year 2023, with information included up to August 2024 where possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of at least 20 Monitor researchers covering more than 30 countries. The researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org.²

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of this report and their assistance in the release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of five NGOs, as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Eva Maria Fischer and Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt), Monitor Editorial Team leaders (Ban Policy: Mary Wareham; Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic; and Support for Mine Action: Ruth Bottomley), and relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Eléa Boureux, Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer, and Tamar Gabelnick).

From January to August 2024, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy:** Mary Wareham, Susan Aboeid, Mark Hiznay, and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan; and
- **Impact:** Loren Persi Vicentic, Katrin Atkins, Eléa Boureux, and Clémentine Tavernier.

This edition also comprises and builds on earlier contributions from Michael Hart (Publications Consultant) through July 2024.

Anna Lim (Editorial Consultant) provided final editing in July and August 2024 with assistance from Eléa Boureux (Project Manager).

Michael Sherwin provided layout and design for this report and its cover. Maps were created by Maria Angela Torri. Heliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland. The front cover photograph was provided by Santiago Ocampo/Norwegian People's Aid and the back cover photographs were provided by HAMAP-Humanitaire and Mines Action Canada. Additional photographs found within *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

² See, Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/who-are-we.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BAC	battle area clearance
CBU	cluster bomb unit
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
CMR	cluster munition remnants
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA	DanChurchAid
DPICM	dual-purpose improved conventional munition
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	explosive remnants of war
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IED	improvised explosive device
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IDP	internally displaced person
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	unexploded ordnance

GLOSSARY

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cluster bomb – Air-dropped cluster munition.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of landmines, submunitions or bomblets, or other ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of unexploded ordnance.

Convention on Cluster Munitions – An international convention adopted in May 2008 and opened for signature in December 2008, which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The UN Secretary-General is the depository. The convention prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. It also requires stockpile destruction, clearance, and victim assistance.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person’s social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) – A type of cluster munition that can be used against both personnel and material targets, including armor.

Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising the awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Landmines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action (HMA) – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes the survey, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Interoperability – In relation to Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, interoperability refers to joint military operations with states not party to the convention.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to creating layers of inequality.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For the Monitor’s purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Oslo Process – The diplomatic process undertaken from 2006–2008 that led to the negotiation, adoption, and signing of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Self-destruct mechanism – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an “incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated.”

Self-deactivating – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, automatically rendering a munition inoperable by making an essential component (e.g. a battery) non-functional.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivor – A person who has been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and has survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of ordnance.

Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded submunitions or **unexploded bomblets** – Submunitions or bomblets that have failed to explode as intended at the time of use, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were prepared to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalization or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.”

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 August 2024

Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 August 2024

Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 August 2024

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Belize	Honduras
Bolivia	Mexico
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Panama
Colombia	Paraguay
Costa Rica	Peru
Cuba	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Dominican Rep.	Saint Lucia
Ecuador	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
El Salvador	Trinidad & Tobago
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	
Jamaica	Haiti
Argentina	Suriname
Bahamas	United States
Barbados	Venezuela
Brazil	
Dominica	

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Cook Islands	Niue
Fiji	Palau
Japan	Philippines
Lao PDR	Samoa
Maldives	Sri Lanka
Indonesia	
Bangladesh	Mongolia
Bhutan	Myanmar
Brunei Darussalam	Nepal
Cambodia	Pakistan
China	Papua New Guinea
India	Singapore
Kiribati	Solomon Islands
Korea, North	Thailand
Korea, South	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tonga
Marshall Islands	Tuvalu
Micronesia, Fed. States	Vanuatu
	Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Holy See	Netherlands
Andorra	Hungary	North Macedonia
Austria	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Ireland	Portugal
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Italy	San Marino
Bulgaria	Liechtenstein	Slovakia
Croatia	Lithuania	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Spain
Denmark	Malta	Sweden
France	Moldova	Switzerland
Germany	Monaco	United Kingdom
Cyprus	Montenegro	
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Türkiye
Belarus	Latvia	Turkmenistan
Estonia	Poland	Ukraine
Finland	Romania	Uzbekistan
Georgia	Russia	
Greece	Serbia	

Middle East & North Africa

Iraq	Palestine	Tunisia
Lebanon		
Algeria	Kuwait	Syria
Bahrain	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Morocco	Yemen
Iran	Oman	
Israel	Qatar	
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	

Sub-Saharan Africa

Benin	Ghana	Nigeria
Botswana	Guinea	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	São Tomé & Príncipe
Burundi	Lesotho	Senegal
Cameroon	Madagascar	Seychelles
Cabo Verde	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Chad	Mali	Somalia
Congo, Rep.	Mauritania	South Africa
Comoros	Mauritius	South Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Mozambique	Togo
Eswatini	Namibia	Zambia
Gambia	Niger	
Angola	Djibouti	Tanzania
Central African Rep.	Kenya	Uganda
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Liberia	
Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	Sudan
Eritrea	Gabon	Zimbabwe

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Two deminers conducting non-technical survey in a cemetery contaminated with explosive remnants of war, including cluster munition remnants, in Mykolaiv, Ukraine.

© Rasmus Emil Gravesen/DCA, February 2024

MAJOR FINDINGS

As of 1 August 2024

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- The convention has 112 States Parties and 12 signatories. The last country to accede was South Sudan in August 2023, while Nigeria was the last to ratify it in February 2023.
- Lithuania enacted a law on 26 July 2024 approving its withdrawal from the convention, which will take effect six months after it follows the steps prescribed in Article 20.
- An annual resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) promoting the convention was adopted in December 2023 by 148 states, including 37 non-signatories to the convention. Russia was the only country to vote against it.

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine by Russian and Ukrainian forces in 2023 and through July 2024, while new use was also recorded in Myanmar and Syria.
- There have been no reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in May 2008.

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

- Ukraine had the highest number of annual casualties globally for the second consecutive year. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, over a thousand cluster munition casualties have been recorded in Ukraine.
- Globally, 219 people were killed or injured by cluster munitions in 2023.
- The 2023 global number of casualties represents a significant decrease compared to the previous year's record spike, however, the actual number is likely much higher as many casualties go unreported.
 - In Ukraine alone, more than 50 cluster munition attacks were reported in 2023 where the number of casualties that occurred was not noted.

- New casualties from cluster munitions were recorded in nine countries—Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen—in 2023.
 - All of those countries, except Myanmar, had new casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2023.
 - Casualties from cluster munition attacks occurred in three countries—Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine—all non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
- Of the total reported casualties in 2023, 118 were the result of cluster munition attacks, while 101 were caused by cluster munition remnants.
- Cluster munitions and their remnants continued to disproportionately impact civilians and civilian objects including schools, hospitals, and agricultural land.
 - Civilians accounted for 93% of all casualties recorded for 2023, where the status was recorded.
- Children are at particularly high risk of harm from cluster munition remnants, especially submunitions.
 - Children accounted for almost half (47%) of all casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2023. Children made up the majority of casualties from cluster munition remnants in States Parties Iraq and Lebanon, and in non-signatory Syria.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND RETENTION

- Since the convention's adoption in 2008, States Parties have collectively destroyed 100% of the cluster munition stocks that they declared, destroying 1.49 million cluster munitions and 179 million submunitions.
- Bulgaria, Slovakia, and South Africa announced the completion of the destruction of their respective cluster munition stocks in September 2023, while Peru completed its stockpile destruction in December 2023. With Peru's completion, all current States Parties have now completed destruction of their stocks.
- Only 10 States Parties are retaining live cluster munitions for permitted research and training purposes, of which Germany has the highest number. Belgium destroyed all of its retained cluster munitions during 2023.

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

- A total of 28 countries and other areas are contaminated or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, including 10 States Parties to the convention—Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and the newest State Party, South Sudan.
- State Party Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) completed clearance of cluster munition remnants in August 2023, becoming the ninth State Party to meet its clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
- Contaminated States Parties reported the clearance of 83.91km² of cluster munition contaminated land during 2023, resulting in the destruction of at least 73,348 cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets. This is a decrease from the 93.49 km² of land cleared and the 77,408 cluster munition remnants destroyed in 2022.
- In the first half of 2024, Chad, Germany, and Lao PDR each requested to extend their current clearance deadlines. These requests will be considered and decided at the convention's Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in September 2024.

RISK EDUCATION

- In 2023, men and boys remained the groups at highest risk of harm from cluster munition remnants.

- All contaminated States Parties carried out risk education activities in 2023 warning of the dangers of cluster munition remnants and other explosive hazards, except for Chile and Germany, where cluster munition contaminated areas are on military land that is inaccessible to the public.
- These risk education activities reached men (23%), women (11%), boys (38%), and girls (28%).

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- Victim assistance efforts under the Convention on Cluster Munitions saw some progress, but many States Parties faced significant challenges in providing adequate and accessible services.
- Healthcare systems in Afghanistan and Lebanon were severely compromised, with increased restrictions on access to health services for women and girls in Afghanistan, and for refugees in Lebanon.
- Limited progress was made in socio-economic inclusion and financial assistance for victims, leaving many needs unmet.

PRODUCTION

- Since 2023, the number of countries producing cluster munitions increased from 16—Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Türkiye, and the US—to 17 with the addition of Myanmar. None of them are party to the convention.
- Cluster Munition Monitor found evidence of new cluster munition production in India, Myanmar, Russia, and South Korea during the reporting period.

TRANSFER

- Between July 2023 and April 2024, US President Joe Biden approved five transfers to Ukraine of US cluster munitions delivered by 155mm artillery projectiles and by ballistic missiles. Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries in this period, but reports of such transfers have been denied by the countries concerned.
- At the Eurosatory Arms Exhibition in Paris in June 2024, companies from India and South Korea promoted their cluster munitions for sale.
- In the past, at least 15 countries have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

- A total of 106 States Parties have submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, including the newest States Parties Nigeria and South Sudan. Six have not done so, of which Cabo Verde, Comoros, and Togo are more than a decade late.
- Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic, as more than half of States Parties do not provide updates to their transparency reports annually.

NATIONAL LEGISLATION

- A total of 33 States Parties have specific implementation laws for the convention. The last country to enact national implementing legislation was Niue in 2021.
- Another 22 States Parties are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention, while 43 States Parties regard their existing laws and regulations as sufficient.



The tail section of a Smerch rocket in a field near the town Snihurivka, Mykolaiv oblast, Ukraine.

© Rasmus Emil Gravesen/DCA, May 2024

CLUSTER MUNITION BAN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions is having a positive impact and making demonstrable progress. However, continued production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by countries that have not banned these weapons is threatening to undermine the convention's norms and impact its universality.

Cluster munitions predominantly harm civilians, both at the time of use and for years afterwards. Delivered from aircraft or fired in rockets, missiles, artillery, and mortars, cluster munitions open in the air to disperse multiple submunitions over a wide area. Many submunitions fail to detonate as designed and pose a long-lasting danger.

The stigmatization of these weapons has intensified since the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted in Dublin, Ireland on 30 May 2008 and entered into force on 1 August 2010. The convention has 112 States Parties and 12 signatories. The most recent country to join is South Sudan, which acceded in August 2023.

The convention comprehensively prohibits cluster munitions and no State Party is reported or alleged to have used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions since the convention's adoption.

Under the convention, nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and more than 179 million submunitions have been destroyed from stocks of States Parties. The convention reached a major implementation milestone in December 2023 when Peru completed the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions, as it was the last State Party with declared stockpiles to fulfill this obligation. In September 2023, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and South Africa announced the completion of the destruction of their respective stocks.

Yet many non-signatories possess significant stockpiles, so this does not mean the total eradication of stocks is complete. Indeed, several states outside the convention are drawing on their stocks to transfer and/or use cluster munitions. Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions since 2012, while new use was also recorded in Myanmar in 2023.

The most extensive use of cluster munitions in the world is seen in Ukraine, where Russia has used cluster munitions repeatedly since the first day of its full-scale invasion of the



Mine Action Fellows deliver a closing statement at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Geneva, Switzerland.

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country on 24 February 2022, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, damaging civilian infrastructure, and contaminating agricultural land. Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions, resulting in civilian casualties. Both parties to the conflict continue to use cluster munitions.

Between July 2023 and April 2024, United States (US) President Joe Biden approved five transfers to Ukraine of US cluster munitions delivered by 155mm artillery projectiles and by ballistic missiles.

The actions of these non-signatories may be influencing others. As this report was being finalized, the president of Lithuania signed into law a parliamentary measure approving the country's withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The country's defense officials argue that changes to its national security situation have necessitated the move, especially Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The convention's provision banning any assistance with prohibited activities has been put to the test, raising interpretive issues and questions over compliance with national laws. The lack of US transparency on its cluster munition transfers to Ukraine raises questions about whether the US still stockpiles cluster munitions at its military bases in European States Parties such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, as well as whether the US cluster munitions have transited across the territory of these or other States Parties.

At the Eurosatory Arms Exhibition in Paris in June 2024, companies from states not party India and South Korea promoted their cluster munitions for sale. This raises concerns for Eurosatory host France as it is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its 2010 implementing legislation explicitly prohibits any supply, sale, import, export, trade, brokering, and transfer of cluster munitions as well as the assistance, encouragement or inducement of prohibited activities.

Outside of stockpile destruction, States Parties made limited progress in other implementation areas during the reporting period. No national laws to implement and enforce the convention were enacted during 2023 or the first half of 2024. Compliance with the convention's annual transparency reporting requirement under Article 7 is overall satisfactory, but six States Parties still have not provided their initial reports and less than half of States Parties are providing annual updated reports.

Partnership and collaboration remain hallmarks of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and can be seen in its tight-knit community of States Parties, United Nations (UN) agencies,

the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). A small dedicated staff from the convention's Implementation Support Unit (ISU) provide essential day-to-day support.¹

This ban policy overview covers activities during 2023 and through July 2024. The findings draw from detailed country profiles on ban policy that are available on the Monitor's new website launched in 2024 and from its archived sites.²

UNIVERSALIZATION

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.³

ACCESSIONS

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a one-step process known as accession.⁴

The last country to accede to the convention was South Sudan on 3 August 2023, as reported by *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023*.

Convention on Cluster Munitions membership by regional or security body⁵

Regional body	Support (%)	Support (number of member states)	Non-signatories to the convention
African Union (AU)	81%	44 of 54	Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Zimbabwe
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	30%	3 of 10	Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	78%	21 of 27	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	75%	24 of 32	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, US
Organization of American States (OAS)	77%	27 of 35	Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Dominica, Suriname, US, Venezuela
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	56%	10 of 18	Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

¹ For more information, see, Convention on Cluster Munition Implementation Support Unit (CCM ISU), bit.ly/CCMISU.

² See, Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org. See also 2010-2022 archived country profiles, bit.ly/MonitorArchives2; and 1999-2014 archived country profiles, bit.ly/MonitorArchives1.

³ Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

⁴ Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

⁵ The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is an African Union (AU) member, but Western Sahara's lack of official representation at the UN prevents it from joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Country Profile: Western Sahara: Cluster Munition Ban Policy," updated 13 September 2021, bit.ly/MonitorWSClusterBan2021.

RATIFICATIONS

The last country to ratify the convention was Nigeria on 28 February 2023, as reported by *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023*.

Of the 12 signatories that still need to ratify the convention, eight are in Sub-Saharan Africa, two are in the Caribbean, one is from Europe, and one is from Asia.⁶

Most of the remaining signatories do not appear to have referred requests to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval.

The vast majority of signatories have ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify the convention, though it is clear that the pace of ratifications has slowed significantly.⁷

WITHDRAWALS

On 18 July 2024, the parliament of Lithuania approved a legislative proposal to withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁸ No country has ever withdrawn from the convention or from the four other humanitarian disarmament treaties.⁹ The law entered into force on July 26, one day after it was signed by President Gitanas Nausėda. Lithuania's withdrawal will take effect six months after the documents are submitted to the UN and the convention's States Parties as long as Lithuania is not engaged in armed conflict at that time.¹⁰ Article 20 of the convention explicitly prevents a State Party that is engaged in armed conflict from withdrawing before the end of the conflict.

MEETINGS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties took place at the UN in Geneva from 11–14 September 2023, under the presidency of Ambassador Abdul-Karim Hashim Mustafa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva. A total of 96 countries attended the meeting—69 States Parties, five signatories, and 12 non-signatories—in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.¹¹

The meeting took stock of implementation of the convention since the Second Review Conference in 2021, which adopted the 50-point Lausanne Action Plan to guide the convention's work over the period 2021–2026.¹² At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, States Parties adopted a final report that “underscored the obligation of States Parties

Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Angola
Central African Republic
Cyprus
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Djibouti
Haiti
Indonesia
Jamaica
Kenya
Liberia
Tanzania
Uganda

⁶ Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that “would defeat the object and purpose” of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered customary international law and binding on all countries.

⁷ A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, while 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference held in September 2015. Another 10 states ratified in the five years leading to the Second Review Conference, held in two parts, in November 2020 and September 2021. Since then, only one state has ratified (Nigeria).

⁸ Paulius Perminas, “Lithuania leaves convention banning cluster munitions,” *Lithuanian Radio and Television (LRT)*, 18 July 2024, bit.ly/LRT18July2024.

⁹ The Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

¹⁰ Therefore, the Monitor has counted Lithuania as a State Party in this report as the withdrawal process is not completed yet.

¹¹ Non-signatories Argentina, Armenia, Cambodia, Finland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Zimbabwe participated in the meeting as observers.

¹² Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Annex II: Lausanne Action Plan,” CCM/CONF/2021/6, 6 October 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII.

never under any circumstances to use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer cluster munitions and, in accordance with the object and provisions of the Convention, condemned any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”¹³ The report goes on to state that “in this connection the Meeting expressed its grave concern at the significant increase in civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact resulting from the repeated and well documented use of cluster munitions since the Second review Conference. This grave concern applies in particular to the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine.”

The Meeting confirmed Ambassador Francisca Elizabeth Méndez Escobar, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN in Geneva, as president of the convention’s Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva from 10–13 September 2024.

Several signatories to the convention participated in regional workshops held by Mexico in New York in July 2024.¹⁴

The Convention on Cluster Munitions is the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and the unacceptable harm they cause. There were no formal proposals for the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to consider cluster munitions again, after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 78/32

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a useful barometer for measuring interest in and support for the convention, especially in states that have not joined.

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions¹⁵

Year	Resolution	In Favor	Against	Abstained
2015	70/54	139	2	39
2016	71/45	141	2	39
2017	72/54	142	2	36
2018	73/54	144	1	38
2019	74/62	144	1	38
2020	75/62	147	0	38
2021	76/47	146	1	37
2022	77/79	144	1	37
2023	78/32	148	1	36

¹³ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties,” Geneva, 29 September 2023, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

¹⁴ Representatives from signatories Haiti and Jamaica attended the Caribbean workshop held on 1 July 2024, while representatives from signatory Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) attended the African workshop held on 2 July 2024. Email from Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer, Deputy Director, ICBL-CMC, 23 July 2024.

¹⁵ See, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 78/32, 4 December 2023, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/78/32; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 77/79, 7 December 2022, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/77/79; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/47; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/74/62; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/73/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/54; “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/71/45; and “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/70/54.

Since its introduction in 2015, support for the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown and the 2023 vote result represents an all-time high. On 4 December 2023, a total of 148 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 78/32 on the Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, while Russia voted no, and 36 states abstained.¹⁶

A total of 37 non-signatories to the convention voted for the resolution, including Turkmenistan for the first time.¹⁷

Russia voted against the resolution as it has done since 2015, except when it abstained in 2018 and 2020.

Thirty-six states abstained from voting on the UNGA resolution including States Parties Niger and South Sudan, and signatories Cyprus and Uganda.¹⁸

During the debate, several states not party explained their vote on the 2023 resolution, including Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and South Korea.¹⁹

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention's core obligations designed to eliminate future humanitarian impact, most crucially the absolute ban on use of cluster munitions. Under Article 1(1)(a), each State Party undertakes "never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions."

HISTORIC USE

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008. Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK), are States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 39 countries and five other areas, as shown by the Timeline of Use at the end of this overview chapter. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions have been used by 10 non-signatories: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Ukraine.

¹⁶ "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 78/32, 4 December 2023, www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/78/32.

¹⁷ These non-signatories voted in favor: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Yemen.

¹⁸ The following states abstained from the vote: Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Cambodia, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, US, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁹ UN Press, "First Committee Approves New Resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, as Speaker Warns 'An Algorithm Must Not Be in Full Control of Decisions Involving Killing,'" 1 November 2023, bit.ly/FirstCommittee1Nov2023.

Most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, only Israel, Russia, and the US are known to be major users and producers of cluster munitions.²⁰

Past users of cluster munitions²¹

User state	Locations used
Armenia	Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>
Colombia	Colombia
Eritrea	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrea
France	Chad, Iraq, Kuwait
Georgia	Georgia, possibly <i>Abkhazia</i>
Iraq	Iran, Iraq
Israel	Egypt, Lebanon, Syria
Libya	Chad, Libya
Morocco	Mauritania, <i>Western Sahara</i>
Netherlands	Former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Nigeria	Sierra Leone
Russia	Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, <i>Chechnya</i>
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South Africa	Admitted past use, but did not specify where
Sudan	Sudan
Syria	Syria
Thailand	Cambodia
Ukraine	Ukraine
UK	Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia), <i>Falklands/Malvinas</i>
US	Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of)	Albania, BiH, Croatia, <i>Kosovo</i>

Note: other areas are indicated in *italics*; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions, in part due to a lack of the necessary infrastructure and the complexity of operating these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by Croat and Serb

²⁰ Nine non-signatories that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and Türkiye), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers (India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore). This leaves Israel, Myanmar, Russia, and the US as the only countries to *both* produce and use cluster munitions.

²¹ This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete, as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Armenia, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

militias; in Croatia by a Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists (in 2014–2015).

NEW USE

Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine during the reporting period, as well as in Myanmar and Syria. Russia has also alleged that cluster munitions have been used on its territory. None of these countries have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

UKRAINE

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions repeatedly in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022, causing civilian casualties, damaging civilian infrastructure, and contaminating agricultural land.²² Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions, causing civilian deaths and injuries.

Both parties to the conflict continued to use cluster munitions during 2023 and the first half of 2024, but it was not possible to systematically document and attribute the continued use of these weapons given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities.

However, Russian forces have continued their cluster munition attacks on densely populated urban areas. For example, on 29 April 2024, a ballistic missile equipped with a cluster munition warhead launched by Russian forces scattered submunitions in and around a compound on Odesa's waterfront, killing seven civilians and wounding another 28, including a pregnant woman and a child.²³

Russian officials and state-controlled media outlets alleged that Ukrainian forces used cluster munitions on Russian territory at least a dozen times between July 2023 and July 2024, but the Monitor has not been able to independently verify these claims. Russian media alleged that one attack on Rylsk in the Kursk region on 5 October 2023 injured a woman and destroyed homes.²⁴

As of July 2024, at least 13 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions have been used in Ukraine since February 2022.²⁵ These types of cluster munitions are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and projectiles except for the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft.

At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2023, States Parties condemned "any use of cluster munitions by any actor."²⁶ They expressed "grave concern at the significant increase in civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact resulting from the repeated and well documented use of cluster munitions" since 2021, particularly with respect to "the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine."

²² Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine," 11 May 2022, bit.ly/HRWUkraine11May2022.

²³ HRW, "Ukraine: Russia's Odesa Cluster Munition Attack Harms Civilians," 29 May 2024, bit.ly/HRWUkraine29May2024.

²⁴ "The Ukrainian Armed Forces damaged more than 30 houses during shelling of Rylsk in the Kursk region," *Ria Novosti*, 5 October 2023; and "One Woman Injured in Kursk Region in Ukraine's Shelling Using Cluster Munitions – Governor," *Sputnik International*, 5 October 2023, bit.ly/SputnikInternational5Oct2023.

²⁵ In addition, re-purposed bomblets from cluster munitions are being removed from their delivery containers and dropped by armed drones.

²⁶ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties," Geneva, 29 September 2023, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

Cluster munitions used in Ukraine, 2022–2024

Ground-fired rockets and missiles	Ground-fired artillery and mortar projectiles	Air-delivered bombs and rockets
220mm 9M27K-series Uragan 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch 300mm 9M54-series Tornado-S 9M549 Tornado-S 9M79-series Tochka Iskander-M 9M723K1 M39 and M39A1 ATACMS	203mm 3-O-14 155mm M864 & M483A1 DPICM 152mm 3-O-13 240mm 3-O-8 120mm M971 DPICM	RBK-500 PTAB-1M Individual ShOAB-0.5 submunitions Individual PTAB-2.5 submunitions

The use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the UNGA, the Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as of 1 July 2024.²⁷ The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC.

MYANMAR

In the past, Myanmar has stated that it has never used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions.²⁸ However, evidence has emerged that indicates its armed forces have used a domestically produced air-dropped cluster munition since 2022.

The Monitor has reviewed photographs of cluster munition remnants, witness accounts, media reporting, and other evidence from attacks by the Myanmar Air Force in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and the Sagaing region since 2022.

Several cluster munition attacks were reported during 2023 and into 2024. Photographs of the aftermath of a 6 June 2023 airstrike in Kedong village tract in Kawkaireik township, Kayin state, showed cluster munition remnants among the debris at a damaged school.²⁹ On 1 December 2023, cluster bombs were used in a Myanmar military attack on Namkham township in northern Shan state that allegedly killed one resident, injured five others, and damaged homes according to an investigation by Amnesty International.³⁰ Cluster bombs were reportedly used in a Myanmar military airstrike on Auk Chaing village in Mindat township, Chin state on 3 April 2024.³¹ The Myanmar military denied attacking the village.³² Most recently, photographs of the aftermath of an 8 January 2024 airstrike in Thapyi Kan village in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state, show cluster munition remnants.³³

²⁷ Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom (UK).

²⁸ See, for example, statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015, bit.ly/MyanmarStatement15Oct2025.

²⁹ Facebook post by Karen National Union (KNU), 6 June 2023, bit.ly/KNUFacebookPost6June2023. Subsequent correspondence on Signal with a KNLA officer, 20 June 2023. The KNLA officer requested anonymity.

³⁰ Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Military should be investigated for war crimes in response to ‘Operation 1207,’” 21 December 2023, bit.ly/AmnestyMyanmar21Dec2023.

³¹ “Mintang Township, Air bombardment of Okchai village by the army,” *Khit Thit Media*, 5 April 2024, bit.ly/KhitThitMedia5Apr2024.

³² “Subversive media circulate misinformation about Aukchai village in Mindat,” *Myanmar News Agency*, 7 April 2024.

³³ Facebook post by *Narinjara News*, 8 January 2024, bit.ly/NarinjaraNewsFacebook8Jan2024.

A March 2024 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, states that “photograph and video evidence suggests the Myanmar military’s continued use of cluster munitions, including during Operation 1027. The military’s use of cluster munitions, which are inherently indiscriminate weapons, in areas inhabited by civilians likely constitutes a war crime.”³⁴ Responding to the UN report, Myanmar denied using cluster munitions, stating: “With regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”³⁵

SYRIA

The Syrian Armed Forces used cluster munitions extensively and repeatedly in 2012–2020, with the support of Russia, while their use of cluster munitions has decreased in 2021–2024. Cluster munition rockets were used in attacks documented by the UN, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) in October and November 2023 in two governorates.

On 6 October 2023, the Syrian government used cluster munitions in an attack on the town of Termanin in Idlib governorate, killing two civilians and injuring nine others. The next day, a 9-year-old boy picked up a munition that had failed to detonate on impact during the attack. It exploded, injuring him and two others. Photographs of remnants cleared after the attack by Syria Civil Defence show 9N235 or 9N210 fragmentation submunitions lying on the ground and the remnants of 9M27K-series Uragan rockets that deliver them.³⁶ A February 2024 report by the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry (UN Commission of Inquiry) on the Syrian Arab Republic refers to the cluster munition attack on Termanin on 6 October 2023 and calls on the Syrian government to immediately cease using cluster munitions in populated areas and ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions.³⁷

Syria Civil Defence responded to a cluster bomb attack near Qabasin in Aleppo governorate on 18 November 2023, which it said killed a child and injured three others.³⁸ In late December 2023, Syria Civil Defence shared images of ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions delivered by RBK-500 cluster bombs lying *in situ* that it said it cleared from “agricultural lands and near civilian homes” in Idlib governorate after days of attacks by “Syrian regime forces and Russia.”³⁹

Previously, on 6 November 2022, eight civilians were killed and at least 75 others injured when the Syrian government, with Russian military support, used Uragan cluster munition rockets in attacks on five camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Idlib governorate.⁴⁰

34 Human Rights Council, “Situation of human rights in Myanmar – Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews,” 20 March 2024, www.undocs.org/en/A/HRC/55/65.

35 Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Geneva, “Myanmar’s Observations on the report entitled ‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,’” 15 March 2024, bit.ly/MyanmarGVA15March2024.

36 HRW, “Northwest Syria: Government Uses Cluster Munitions,” 5 November 2023, bit.ly/HRWSyria5Nov2023.

37 See, Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 9 February 2024, p. 20, www.undocs.org/en/A/HRC/55/64.

38 The White Helmets (SyriaCivilDef), “Scenes from our teams’ response to a cluster bomb explosion left over from bombing by the Syrian regime and Russia near Qabasin, east of #Aleppo, today, Saturday, November 18. The explosion led to the death of a child and the injury of three others. #WhiteHelmets #Syria.” 18 November 2023, 20:12 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/WhiteHelmets18Nov2023.

39 The White Helmets (SyriaCivilDef), “Over the past ten days, our teams have disposed of several unexploded ordnances resulting from shelling by Syrian regime forces and Russia in the NW #Syria. Among them are 6 cluster bombs in agricultural lands and near civilian homes. Our teams work continuously to survey areas contaminated by war remnants and raise awareness among civilians. #WhiteHelmets.” 28 December 2023, 16:29 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/WhiteHelmets28Dec2023.

40 HRW, “Syria: Cluster Munitions Used in November 6 Attacks,” 23 November 2022, bit.ly/HRW23Nov2022; Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 13 March 2023, bit.ly/HRCSyria13March2023; and Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), “Investigation: The Syrian Regime Used Cluster Munitions to Target a Gathering of IDPs Camps in Northwestern Idlib City,” 21 March 2023, bit.ly/SNHRIdlib21March2023.

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, global public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.⁴¹ In September 2023, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Geneva, States Parties adopted a report that expressed “grave concern at the significant increase in civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact resulting from the repeated and well documented use of cluster munitions since the Second review Conference.”⁴² During the course of the meeting, many countries and the EU publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with at least five countries citing Syria as the key country of concern.⁴³

Since May 2013, the UNGA has adopted 11 resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.⁴⁴ Since 2014, states have also adopted more than 20 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.⁴⁵ The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks by Syrian government forces.⁴⁶

UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS ON USE

Several states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions have imposed unilateral restrictions on their own use of cluster munitions.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but has not used them since 2003 in Iraq with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. However, in 2017, the US revoked a Department of Defense directive that had required the US to no longer use cluster munitions that resulted in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO), which was due to come into effect in 2018.

Estonia, Finland, Poland, and Romania have committed not to use cluster munitions outside their own territories. Thailand claims to have removed cluster munitions from its operational stocks.⁴⁷

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions.

⁴¹ More than 145 countries, including 53 non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements.

⁴² Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties,” Geneva, 29 September 2023, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

⁴³ Canada, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, in addition to the EU.

⁴⁴ See, for example, “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 78/222, 19 December 2023, bit.ly/UNGAResolutionSyria19Dec2023.

⁴⁵ Human Rights Council, “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” 19 July 2023, bit.ly/HRCsyria13July2023.

⁴⁶ Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 11 March 2024, bit.ly/HRCsyria11March2024; Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 13 March 2023, bit.ly/HRCsyria13March2023; Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 21 January 2021, www.undocs.org/A/HRC/46/54; Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” 28 January 2020, www.undocs.org/A/HRC/43/57; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “They have erased the dreams of my children: children’s rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” 17 January 2020, bit.ly/OHCHRsyria13Jan2020; and OHCHR, “UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: The siege and recapture of eastern Ghouta marked by war crimes, crimes against humanity,” 20 June 2018, bit.ly/OHCHRsyria20June2018.

⁴⁷ Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) meeting with Maj.-Gen. Thongchai Rodyoi, Royal Thai Army, Bangkok, 9 July 2018.

HISTORIC PRODUCTION

Since World War II, at least 35 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴⁸

Of the 18 states that have ceased production of cluster munitions, all are States Parties to the convention with the exception of Argentina. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period.

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of cluster munition production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.⁴⁹

CURRENT PRODUCERS

Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party. However, a total of 17 countries are currently producing or produced cluster munitions in the past and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future, as listed below. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Since the previous Cluster Munition Monitor report, the number of cluster munition producers has increased from 16 to 17 with the addition of Myanmar.

NEW DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

Cluster Munition Monitor found evidence of new cluster munition production in India, Myanmar, Russia, and South Korea during the reporting period, but an overall lack of transparency means that production may have occurred in other countries listed as producers.

An open tender call on the Indian Ordnance Factories website for dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunition components and parts in May 2024 appears to indicate ongoing production.⁵⁰ The Defense Research and Development Organisation of India's Ministry of Defence has produced a cargo rocket containing DPICM submunitions for the 214mm Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher system.⁵¹

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina	Italy
Australia	Japan
Belgium	Netherlands
BiH	Slovakia
Chile	South Africa
Croatia	Spain
France	Sweden
Germany	Switzerland
Iraq	UK

Cluster munition producers

Brazil	Myanmar
China	Pakistan
Egypt	Poland
Greece	Romania
India	Russia
Iran	Singapore
Israel	Türkiye
Korea, North	US
Korea, South	

⁴⁸ The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers' delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

⁴⁹ Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared that "there are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina." BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

⁵⁰ Indian Ordnance Factories, "Centralised Online Vendor Registration Portal," accessed 18 May 2024, bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPortal.

⁵¹ Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., *Jane's Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008* (Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2007), p. 715.

Evidence emerged in 2023 that indicates Myanmar has developed and manufactured a cluster munition since 2021, which has been used in several attacks.⁵² The air-delivered bomb consists of a shell casing that contains twelve 120mm mortar projectiles, attached to and released from an internal frame as submunitions. Each one has a plastic arming vane attached to an impact fuze that detonates on contact. The origin of this rudimentary cluster bomb is unknown, but it appears similar to other products made by the state-owned weapons production facility “KaPaSa,” or Defense Products Industries of Myanmar. In September 2023, the Cluster Munition Monitor reported that the weapon appears to meet the definition of a cluster munition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In March 2024, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Geneva issued a statement denying that this weapon is a cluster munition.⁵³

Russia continues to produce new cluster munitions, including two newly developed types that its forces have used in the conflict in Ukraine since 2022. The Russian Armed Forces have used the 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splyav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions. The same company is producing guided 9M54-series cluster munition missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.⁵⁴ Russia has also used a cluster munition variant of its new Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile system containing 54 9N730 dual-purpose submunitions.

South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed the production of cluster munitions during 2023 “at a cost of KRW 186,484 million (USD 138 million).”⁵⁵ South Korea produces 155mm DPICM artillery projectiles, as well as 239mm cluster munition rockets with submunitions equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.⁵⁶

LIMITED OR NO CURRENT PRODUCTION

Greece, Israel, Poland, Romania, Singapore, and Türkiye have indicated no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they commit to never produce cluster munitions in the future.⁵⁷ States that say their policy is aligned with the convention’s prohibitions should elaborate how specific policies, practices, and doctrines have changed in this regard, and detail measures being put in place to deter and prevent such activities in the future.

⁵² Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Briefing Paper: Cluster Munition Production and Use in Myanmar/Burma,” 31 August 2023, bit.ly/MonitorMyanmar31Aug2023.

⁵³ It stated that, “[w]ith regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Geneva, “Myanmar’s Observations on the report entitled ‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,’” 15 March 2024, bit.ly/MyanmarGVA15March2024.

⁵⁴ According to Rostec (the parent company of Splyav State Research and Production Enterprise), Russian president Vladimir Putin reportedly set an objective in 2016 for the company to use only Russian components in the modernized multi-launch rocket systems. See, Rostec, “The New Rocket System Passes Official Tests,” 25 January 2017, rostec.ru/en/news/4519813/.

⁵⁵ Response from Yoon Dong-han, Ammunition Program Team, Firepower Program Department, Current Capabilities Program Agency, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 1 May 2024. World Without War is a national member of CMC in South Korea.

⁵⁶ Response from Yoon Dong-han, Ammunition Program Team, Firepower Program Department, Current Capabilities Program Agency, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 19 July 2023.

⁵⁷ For example, in April and October 2021, Türkiye informed the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that “Turkey has never used, produced, imported or transferred cluster munitions since 2005 and does not intend to do so in the future.” Letter to Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK, President of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, from Amb. Sadik Arslan, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the UN in Geneva, 5 October 2021.

Since the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, several companies that once manufactured cluster munitions have ceased their production:

- Israel's last cluster munition manufacturer, Israel Military Industries (IMI), was acquired in late 2018 by Elbit Systems Ltd., which confirmed in October 2020 that it had discontinued the production of cluster munitions.⁵⁸
- A Romanian company told the Monitor in July 2023 that, "although Romania is not yet a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, AEROTEH S.A. has decided since 2008 not to be involved in the production of cluster munitions and is firmly committed not to produce any type of components for such ammunition in the future nor to participate in any governmental or industrial cooperation program with other companies for the production or development of cluster munitions."⁵⁹
- Singapore's only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it would no longer produce them, stating: "As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components."⁶⁰

US ALTERNATIVES

The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.⁶¹ The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, formally ended its production of the weapon in 2016.⁶²

However, the US is developing and producing several replacements for cluster munitions that may fail to meet the submunition reliability policy of its own Department of Defense, and that may still fall under the definition of cluster munitions prohibited under the convention.

The US Army has budgeted over \$600 million during 2022–2029 for researching and developing replacements for 155mm artillery projectiles containing older DPICM (M42/

⁵⁸ In October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. stated that it had "discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI's M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions." Email to PAX from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer, and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., 14 October 2020. See also, Tovah Lazaroff, "Elbit rejects HSBC's BDS disclaimer stating: 'We don't produce cluster bombs,'" *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 January 2019, [bit.ly/JerusalemPost3Jan2019](https://www.jpost.com/Israel-news/Article-648887); and PAX, "Elbit Systems confirms cluster munitions exit," 23 January 2019, [bit.ly/PAXElbitSystems23Jan2019](https://www.pax.org/press-releases/elbit-systems-confirms-cluster-munitions-exit).

⁵⁹ Email from Dumitru Banut, General Director, AEROTEH S.A., 6 July 2023. A letter attached to the email referred to the company's "Statement of Principles," [bit.ly/AEROTEHStatementofPrinciples2022](https://www.aeroteh.ro/en/About-us/Statement-of-Principles). The letter also stated that during 2022, a meeting of AEROTEH S.A. shareholders decided "to delete from its object of activity 'Manufacturing of Armament and Ammunition - CAEN code 2540'...from the industrial activities of our company." According to the letter, the decision to delete this code "represents also, the commitment of AEROTEH S.A. not to manufacture any type of armaments or ammunition in the future, therefore implicitly no type of components for cluster submunitions." See, AEROTEH S.A., "Decision of the Extraordinary General Assembly of Shareholders: AEROTEH S.A, No. 1 of 08.11.2022," 8 November 2022, [bit.ly/AEROTEHMeeting8Nov2022](https://www.aeroteh.ro/en/About-us/Statement-of-Principles).

⁶⁰ See, Singapore Technologies Engineering website, www.stengg.com/en; PAX, "Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions," 19 November 2015, [bit.ly/StopExplosiveSTE2015](https://www.pax.org/press-releases/singapore-technologies-engineering-stops-production-of-cluster-munitions); and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, "ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions," 18 November 2015. The president of the company said the decision came about in part because "we often get asked by the investment community [about] our stand on cluster munitions." Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, 11 November 2015.

⁶¹ For details on US production of cluster munitions in 2005–2007, see, HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258, [bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009](https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/05/20/banning-cluster-munitions); and ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), p. 263, [bit.ly/CMMonitor2010](https://www.icbl.org/monitor/2010).

⁶² Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) of Hopkins, Minnesota, US, manufactured a solid rocket motor for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105 cluster munition, but produced it only for use in that weapon. See, Marjorie Censer, "Textron to discontinue production of sensor-fuzed weapon," *Inside Defense*, 30 August 2016, [bit.ly/TextronDiscontinue](https://www.insidedefense.com/news/2016/08/30/textron-to-discontinue-production-of-sensor-fuzed-weapon/); and "Last US cluster-bomb maker to cease production," *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, 1 September 2016, [bit.ly/AFPClusterBombs1Sept2016](https://www.afp.com/en/news/2016/09/01/last-us-cluster-bomb-maker-to-cease-production/).

M46). In 2018, two parallel research and development tracks began to develop Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions (C-DAEM) and a replacement for DPICM as “policy-compliant munitions.”⁶³ The US Army has approved acquiring an advanced Israeli-designed M999 antipersonnel munition to fulfil this requirement, and has renamed it the XM1208.⁶⁴ The XM1208 projectile dispenses nine M99 “advanced submunitions.”⁶⁵ The second project in the replacement program is called “C-DAEM DPICM Replacement.” This is intended to attack targets ranging from personnel to soft-skinned vehicles. Both the Army’s fiscal year 2025 research and its procurement justification materials no longer provide details on the C-DAEM DPICM replacement program.⁶⁶

Another replacement program is the Alternative Warhead variant for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rocket, which began production in 2015 to replace M26 rockets, which deliver M77 DPICM munitions. This GMLRS Alternative Warhead contains 160,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments, but no explosive submunitions. A longer-term US research project will test a “Sensor Fuzed Weapon” (type not specified) for delivery by the GMLRS rocket by 2030. Efforts under this project will “determine the feasibility and effectiveness of utilizing GMLRS rockets to dispense anti-armor submunitions for engaging medium and heavy armor targets.”⁶⁷

TRANSFERS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never “transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly” cluster munitions.

HISTORIC TRANSFERS

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. However, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that have in the past transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.⁶⁸ While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was most likely the world’s leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.⁶⁹

⁶³ US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2023, Vol. 3B, pp. 154–163; US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Estimates, “Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” March 2024, p. 412; and US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2024, Vol. 3B, p. 173.

⁶⁴ Ibid. Hardware and some components of this projectile are being imported from Israel in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense. It is unclear if the original Israeli manufacturer is involved in this transfer of technology. Previously, in October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. stated that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” Email to PAX from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer, and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., 14 October 2020.

⁶⁵ US Department of Defense, Joint Program Executive Office: Armaments and Ammunition, “C-DAEM DPICM Replacement (XM1208),” undated, bit.ly/USDODC-DAEM.

⁶⁶ US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2023, Vol. 3B, pp. 154–163.

⁶⁷ US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume III, Budget Activity 7, “Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS),” March 2023, Volume 4B, pp. 301–308.

⁶⁸ There is no comprehensive accounting of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK) in addition to exports by non-signatories Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, US, and the former Yugoslavia.

⁶⁹ Recipients of US exports include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, the UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.⁷⁰ The full extent of China's exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Since the convention took effect in August 2010, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.⁷¹

NEW TRANSFERS

At the beginning of 2023, Ukrainian officials began to publicly ask to be supplied with cluster munitions for use in the war with Russia.⁷²

On 7 July 2023, US officials announced that President Biden had signed a waiver allowing the US to transfer to Ukraine cluster munitions that have a higher than 1% failure rate.⁷³ Between July 2023 and April 2024, President Biden approved five transfers of US cluster munitions to Ukraine for use in the war with Russia.⁷⁴ The US has not disclosed the quantities of cluster munitions that it is providing to Ukraine or information on the specific types and their dud rates.

The US has transferred three tranches of 155mm artillery projectiles containing what the Department of Defense claims to be “highly effective and reliable” DPICM submunitions.⁷⁵ The US stockpiles 155mm M864 artillery projectiles (each containing 72 DPICM submunitions) and M483A1 projectiles (each containing 88 DPICM submunitions). Department of Defense officials claim the DPICM submunitions “have a dud rate less than 2.35 percent” but say that the testing data behind this figure is “classified.”⁷⁶ Historic data for the M42

Announced US Cluster Munition Transfers to Ukraine

Date	Type
7 July 2023	155mm DPICM
21 September 2023	155mm DPICM
17 October 2023	ATACMS M39
12 March 2024	155mm DPICM
24 April 2024	ATACMS M39A1

⁷⁰ Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, cluster munition remnants of Soviet origin have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

⁷¹ States Parties Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purpose of destruction: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

⁷² For example, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2023, Ukraine's deputy prime minister, Olexander Kubrakov, and foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, appealed for Ukraine to be supplied with cluster munitions. See, Munich Security Conference, “Spotlight: Ukraine,” undated, [bit.ly/MSCUkraine2023](https://www.munichsecurityconference.org/en/spotlight-ukraine); and “NATO Secretary General rejects Ukraine's demand for cluster munitions,” *Ukrainska Pravda*, 18 February 2023, [bit.ly/UkrainskaPravda18Feb2023](https://www.ukrainskpravda.com/en/news/ukraine-demand-for-cluster-munitions-rejected).

⁷³ “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” The White House, 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/WhiteHousePressBriefing7July2023](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2023/07/07/2023-07-07-press-briefing); and US Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds Press Briefing,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/DoDPresBriefing7July2023](https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Record/20230707).

⁷⁴ Mary Wareham and Sera Koulabdara, “US Cluster Munition Transfers Raise Humanitarian Concerns,” Humanitarian Disarmament blog, 4 April 2024, [bit.ly/WarehamKoulabdara4Apr2024](https://www.humanitarian.org/en/2024/04/04/us-cluster-munition-transfers-raise-humanitarian-concerns).

⁷⁵ US Department of Defense press release, “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/DoDPresRelease7July2023](https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Record/20230707).

⁷⁶ US Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds Press Briefing,” 7 July 2023, [bit.ly/DoDPresBriefing7July2023](https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Record/20230707).

and M46 DPICM submunitions shows that they have a failure rate of 6–14%; often higher in operations due to wind, soft soil, dense vegetation, and other delivery factors.⁷⁷

In October 2023, the US approved the transfer of M39 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missiles, which contain 950 M74 antipersonnel/antimaterial (AP/AM) submunitions to ranges of 165km (100 miles).⁷⁸ Another transfer of longer range M39A1 ATACMS ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads was announced in April 2024.⁷⁹ The M74 submunitions delivered by ATACMS are understood to have a failure rate of 5–10%, if not higher.

World leaders from 21 countries expressed concern at the US decision to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine.⁸⁰ The US decision to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine received worldwide media coverage and has been criticized by UN officials and the CMC. The US cluster munition transfers have resulted in Congressional debate, scrutiny and legislative proposals. On 17 June 2024, US Congresswoman Dina Titus put forth an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act to prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds “to acquire, use, transfer, or sell cluster munitions.”⁸¹ After a debate on 28 June 2024, the amendment failed with a final vote of 129-284.⁸²

ALLEGED TRANSFERS

US defense officials alleged in June and July 2023 that certain unnamed countries have supplied cluster munitions to Ukraine.⁸³ Media reports indicate that Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries since 2022, possibly Israel, Poland, Romania, and/or Türkiye. None of these countries are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. None of them have publicly admitted to transferring cluster munitions to Ukraine and some have issued vehement denials.

77 From briefings provided to Congress, it appears that the US will transfer 155mm M864 cluster munition artillery projectiles that each contain 72 DPICM submunitions, as well as 155mm M483A1 artillery projectiles that each contain 88 DPICM submunitions. The two types of projectiles deliver M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions. See, John Ismay, “Cluster Weapons U.S. Is Sending Ukraine Often Fail to Detonate,” *The New York Times*, 8 July 2023, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes8July2023; and Karen DeYoung, Alex Horton, and Missy Ryan, “Biden approves cluster munition supply to Ukraine,” *The Washington Post*, 7 July 2023, bit.ly/WashingtonPost7July2023.

78 “Ukraine uses US-provided long-range ATACMS missiles against Russian forces for the first time,” *Associated Press*, 17 October 2023, bit.ly/APUkraineUSMissiles17Oct2023.

79 “US secretly sent long-range missiles to Ukraine after months of resistance,” *CNN*, 24 April 2024, cnn.it/3WI6as3.

80 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK.

81 “Amendment to Rule Committee Print 118-40, Offered by Ms. Titus of Nevada,” 17 June 2024, bit.ly/AmendmentToRuleUSHouse17Jun2024.

82 “Cluster Munitions Debate,” *C-Span*, 28 June 2024, bit.ly/CSpanClusterMunitions28Jun2024.

83 In June 2023, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Army, Gen. Mark Milley, told media that “other European countries have provided some” cluster munitions to Ukraine in recent months. See, Ashley Roque, “White House weighing controversial cluster munitions deliveries to Ukraine,” *Breaking Defense*, 30 June 2023, bit.ly/BreakingDefense30June2023; Sabrina Singh, Deputy Press Secretary, US Department of Defense, on “Meet The Press NOW – July 13,” *NBC News*, YouTube.com, 13 July 2023, bit.ly/NBCNewsYouTube13July2023; and US Department of Defense, “Lt. Gen. Douglas A. Sims II (USA), Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff; Brigadier General Pat Ryder, Pentagon Press Secretary, Hold a Press Briefing,” 13 July 2023, bit.ly/USDoDBriefing13July2023.

Israeli-made or copied M971 120mm cluster munition mortar projectiles were photographed in the possession of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in December 2022.⁸⁴ Israel originally produced this type of cluster munition, but it is not known how or from whom Ukraine acquired it.

According to a March 2024 media report, Ukrainian forces may be using Polish cluster munition rockets in the war with Russia.⁸⁵ Photographs of remnants of rockets with M-21FK and GKO designations have circulated on social media, and were purported to have been taken in Ukraine. Polish-made 122mm Grad rockets as well as RM-70 and WR-40 Langusta systems reportedly deliver cluster munitions containing 42 GKO SC-Frag submunitions.

Senior government officials from Türkiye and Ukraine denied a January 2023 report by a US media outlet that claimed Türkiye had transferred cluster munitions to Ukraine in November 2022.⁸⁶ However, in August 2023, photos circulated on social media that showed clearly marked Turkish-made 155mm M483A1 cluster munition projectiles being used in Ukraine by Ukrainian forces.⁸⁷ Officials from Türkiye have continued to deny providing Turkish cluster munitions to Ukraine. At a Cluster Munition Monitor side event briefing in Geneva on 11 September 2023, Turkish officials described the reports alleging transfer as being “far from reality.”⁸⁸

In October 2023, a media outlet called *Defense One* reported that “import records confirm that Ukraine acquired Turkish-made cluster munitions in July.”⁸⁹ However, the report found that “import records list the shipper as Romtehnica, a Romanian trading company owned by Romania’s defense ministry, rather than Turkey.” According to *Defense One*, “calculations

84 Each M971 120mm mortar projectile delivers 24 M87 DPICM submunitions. See, War in Ukraine (Rinegati), “In Ukraine, something very similar to Israeli M971 mortar cluster munitions has been spotted. Unlike standard cluster munitions, the M971 has a built-in self-destruct mechanism for unexploded submunitions, making them much safer for civilians.” 18 December 2022, 12:50 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/UkraineWarTweet18Dec2022; Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “Who supplied them to Ukraine? That’s not clear. A very limited number of countries reported possession of such mortar bombs and we tend to believe what we see was exported from a country which previously purchased these bombs from Israel.” 17 December 2022, 20:18 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/UkraineWeaponsTrackerTweet17Dec2022; and “Ukraine received M971 cluster bombs (VIDEO),” *UA.TV*, 18 December 2022, bit.ly/UATV18Dec2022.

85 Michal Brzuszewski, “Ukraine Employs Polish Cluster Munitions, Conducting Strikes in Russia?” *Defence 24*, 21 March 2024, bit.ly/Defence24PolishCM21Mar2024.

86 Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, “Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine,” *Foreign Policy*, 10 January 2023, bit.ly/ForeignPolicy10Jan2023. The Turkish president’s spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, denied the report and reportedly stated, “We don’t have cluster munitions and we haven’t provided them to Ukraine.” See, Ragip Soylu, “Russia-Ukraine war: Turkey denies supplying Kyiv with cluster munitions,” *Middle East Eye*, 14 January 2023, bit.ly/MiddleEastEyeCM14Jan2023. Ukraine’s ambassador to Türkiye, Vasyl Bodnar, denied the alleged transfer as “Russian propaganda.” See, Mustafa Devici, “Ukrainian envoy in Türkiye denies claims Ankara sending cluster bombs to Ukraine,” *Anadolu Agency*, 11 January 2023, bit.ly/AnadoluAgency11Jan2023.

87 War Noir (war_noir), “#Russia / #Ukraine: A new photo posted by a combatant of #Ukrainian Forces with a new batch of cluster projectiles on #Zaporizhzhia Axis. The photo shows 155mm M483A1 DPICMs (dual-purpose improved conventional munitions) produced by #Turkey (#Türkiye). This time the ‘MKE’ (government-controlled group of factories) markings can be seen clearly on the projectiles. #RussiaUkraineWar.” 8 August 2023, 17:32 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/WarNoirTurkishCM8Aug2023. Photos with visible markings on the projectiles show that the items were produced by MKEK in 1995 and 1997. See also, Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), “So a little history: the US licensed production of M483A1 DPICM to the now-defunct Dutch company Eurometaal in Zaandam, who subsequently partnered with MKEK (now MKE) to co-produce M483A1 DPICM in Turkey. From the markings visible, the projectiles pictured were produced in 1995.” 9 August 2023, 22:21 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MarkHiznayDPICM9Aug2023; and MilitaryNewsUA (front_ukrainian), “Turkish 155-mm cluster shells M483A1 produced by MKE are in service with the Ukrainian army. The Foreign Policy publication reported on the transfer of these ammunition in January of this year.” 17 May 2023, 11:32 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MilitaryNewsUATurkishCM17May2023.

88 Notes by Cluster Munition Monitor. See also, interview with with Emir Cem Aslanargun, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Türkiye to the United Nations in Geneva, Geneva, 11 September 2023.

89 Sam Skove, “Documents confirm that Ukraine is importing Turkish cluster munitions,” *Defense One*, 26 October 2023, bit.ly/DefenseOne26Oct2023.

based on total value and weight suggest Ukraine purchased 6,074 shells...manufactured between 1994 and 2022.”

In January 2023, Estonian state media reported that Estonia was considering sending its stocks of “thousands” of stockpiled 155mm DM632 cluster munition projectiles to Ukraine.⁹⁰ The transfer of the German-made cluster munitions required prior approval from Germany. In February 2023, Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, said that “Germany won’t authorize the transfer of cluster bombs to Ukraine.”⁹¹ In September 2023, Estonian state media reported that Estonia has not transferred the cluster munitions.⁹² An Estonian official confirmed to Cluster Munition Monitor that “Estonia has not given any cluster munitions to Ukraine” and said it has “only been considering the idea.”⁹³

PROMOTION

During the Eurosatory Arms Exhibition in Paris in June 2024, companies from states not party India and South Korea promoted their cluster munitions. This raises concerns for Eurosatory host France as it is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its 2010 implementing legislation prohibits any supply, sale, import, export, trade, brokering, and transfer of cluster munitions, as well as the assistance, encouragement or inducement of prohibited activities.⁹⁴

Researchers from Amnesty International, Facing Finance, and HRW photographed and collected promotional materials on display at India’s booth at the Eurosatory Arms Exhibition in Paris in June 2024, which were promoting Indian company SMPP ammunition 155mm artillery projectiles containing submunitions.⁹⁵

South Korea declined to answer an official information disclosure act question about whether it exported or transferred any cluster munitions in 2023 or 2022.⁹⁶ However, researchers from Amnesty International and HRW photographed DPICM-type submunitions and artillery-fired and rocket-delivered cluster munition warheads and related promotional

⁹⁰ Madis Hindre, “Estonia weighing giving Ukraine cluster munitions,” *ERR News*, 26 January 2023, bit.ly/ERRNews26Jan2023.

⁹¹ Antonia Faltermaier, “Cluster bombs for Ukraine? Pistorius makes a clear statement,” *Berliner Morgenpost*, 23 February 2023, bit.ly/BerlinerMorgenpost23Feb2023.

⁹² “Estonia still hasn’t sent Ukraine its cluster munitions,” *EER News*, 18 September 2023, bit.ly/EERNews18Sept2023.

⁹³ Email from Karin Voodla, Permanent Mission of Estonia in Geneva, 13 September 2023.

⁹⁴ France’s 2010 Law on the Elimination of Cluster Munitions prohibits the development, manufacture, production, acquisition, stockpiling, supply, sale, import, export, trade, brokering, transfer, and use of cluster munitions, as well as the assistance, encouragement or inducement of prohibited activities. It provides sanctions for violations of up to 10-years imprisonment and/or a fine of €150,000 (US\$162,255). For detailed analysis, see, ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 65–66, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010. Average exchange rate for 2023: €1=US\$1.0817. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 1 February 2024.

⁹⁵ Omega Research Foundation (Omega_RF), “#clustermunition bomblets promoted by Indian company at #Eurosatory this week. Fair organiser @cogeseurosatory closed the stand when alerted by @AmnestyFrance #France is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions @ISUCCM and so this shouldn’t ever have been displayed.” 21 June 2024, 12:20 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/OmegaRFEurosatory21Jun2024.

⁹⁶ Import and export information between countries is classified as exempt from disclosure according to the Official Information Disclosure Act (Article 9. Information subject to Non-Disclosure. (1)2. Information pertaining to the national security, national defense, unification, diplomatic relations, etc., which is deemed likely to seriously undermine national interests, if it is disclosed). Response from Yoon Donghan, Ammunition Program Team, Firepower Program Department, Current Capabilities Program Agency, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 1 May 2024. See also previous Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, and reply from Yoon Hwa-sook, Ammunition Program Team, Firepower Program Department, Current Capabilities Program Agency, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, Ministry of National Defense, 31 May 2023.

materials on display at South Korea's Eurosatory Arms Exhibition booth in Paris in June 2024.⁹⁷ The display was subsequently removed by the organizers.

STOCKPILES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION

GLOBAL STOCKPILES

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 94 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions.⁹⁸

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES PARTIES

In the past, the convention's States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions. At least 45 countries—42 States Parties, two signatories, and one non-signatory—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them.

There are currently no States Parties with declared cluster munition stockpiles still to destroy.⁹⁹

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY SIGNATORIES

At least two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

- Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing a total of 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria.¹⁰⁰ Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all of its stockpiled cluster munitions.
- Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions, but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 "very old" cluster bombs.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Omega Research Foundation (Omega_RF), "Why were #Korean cluster munition bomblets on display at #Eurosatory this week? Fair organiser @cogeseurosatory closed the stand when alerted by @AmnestyFrance – but the bomblets should never have been there – #France is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions @ISUCCM." 20 June 2024, 15:24 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/OmegaRFEurosatory20Jun2024.

⁹⁸ The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, "Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions," 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.

⁹⁹ Guinea apparently imported cluster munitions in the past, but has not confirmed if it still possesses them as it still has not submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was originally due in April 2015.

¹⁰⁰ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 June 2017; Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2019; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2020. The Greek-made GRM-20 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar system uses these projectiles, each of which contains 20 submunitions.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Risha Jilian Chaniago, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 24 June 2022.

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions¹⁰²

States Parties	Signatories	Non-signatories	
Afghanistan	Angola	Algeria	Ukraine
Austria	Cent. African Rep.	Argentina	UAE
Belgium	Cyprus	Armenia	US
BiH	Indonesia	Azerbaijan	Uzbekistan
Botswana		Bahrain	Venezuela
Bulgaria		Belarus	Yemen
Cameroon		Brazil	Zimbabwe
Canada		Cambodia	
Chile		China	
Colombia		Egypt	
Congo, Rep. of		Eritrea	
Côte d'Ivoire		Estonia	
Croatia		Ethiopia	
Cuba		Finland	
Czech Republic		Georgia	
Denmark		Greece	
Ecuador		India	
France		Iran	
Germany		Israel	
Guinea-Bissau		Jordan	
Honduras		Kazakhstan	
Hungary		Korea, North	
Iraq		Korea, South	
Italy		Kuwait	
Japan		Libya	
Moldova		Mongolia	
Montenegro		Morocco	
Mozambique		Myanmar	
Netherlands		Oman	
Nigeria		Pakistan	
North Macedonia		Poland	
Norway		Qatar	
Peru		Romania	
Philippines		Russia	
Portugal		Saudi Arabia	
Slovakia		Serbia	
Slovenia		Singapore	
South Africa		Sudan	
Spain		Syria	
Sweden		Thailand	
Switzerland		Türkiye	
UK		Turkmenistan	
42	4 (2 current)	49 (48 current)	

Note: Countries in **bold** still possess stockpiles.

¹⁰² This information is drawn from Monitor Cluster Munition Ban Policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as statements and other sources. Armenia has been added to the list of stockpilers following evidence of its use of cluster munitions in 2020.

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

- Angola stated in 2017 that all of its stockpiled cluster munitions were destroyed in or by 2012.¹⁰³
- The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.¹⁰⁴

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY NON-SIGNATORIES

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

Some non-signatories have provided limited information on their stocks. For example, the US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”¹⁰⁵ Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2004.¹⁰⁶ Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.¹⁰⁷

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force of the convention for that State Party.

All of the 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 179 million submunitions. This represents 100% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have declared stockpiling.

Bulgaria, Slovakia, and South Africa announced the completion of their respective stockpile destruction at the convention’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2023, while Peru confirmed the completion of its stockpile destruction on 15 December 2023.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Statement of Angola, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017.

¹⁰⁴ Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementCAR14Sep2011.

¹⁰⁵ Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in 2004.

¹⁰⁶ “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated. This document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

¹⁰⁷ “The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs,” *InfoDefensa*, 26 August 2011, bit.ly/InfoDefensa26Aug2011.

¹⁰⁸ See, “Peru completes the destruction of its cluster munitions stockpiles,” *defensa.com*, 28 December 2023, bit.ly/defensa28Dec2023; and HRW, “Cluster Munitions: Peru Destroys Stockpiled Weapons,” 18 December 2023, bit.ly/PeruHRW18Dec2023.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction¹⁰⁹

State Party (year of completion)	Cluster munitions	Submunitions
Austria (2010)	12,672	798,336
Belgium (2010)	115,210	10,138,480
BiH (2011)	445	148,059
Botswana (2018)	510	14,400
Bulgaria (2023)	6,862	186,349
Cameroon (2017)*	6	906
Canada (2014)	13,623	1,361,958
Chile (2013)	249	25,896
Colombia (2009)	72	10,832
Côte d'Ivoire (2013)	68	10,200
Croatia (2018)	7,235	178,318
Cuba (2017)**	1,856	N/R
Czech Republic (2010)	480	16,400
Denmark (2014)	42,176	2,440,940
Ecuador (2004)	117	17,199
France (2016)	34,876	14,916,881
Germany (2015)	573,700	62,923,935
Hungary (2011)	287	3,954
Italy (2015)	4,963	2,849,979
Japan (2015)	14,011	2,027,907
Moldova (2010)	1,385	27,050
Montenegro (2010)	353	51,891
Mozambique (2015)	293	12,804
Netherlands (2012)	193,643	25,867,510
North Macedonia (2013)	2,426	39,980
Norway (2010)	52,190	3,087,910
Peru (2023)	2,012	162,417
Philippines (2011)	114	0
Portugal (2011)	11	1,617
Slovakia (2023)	1,235	299,187
Slovenia (2017)	1,080	52,920
South Africa (2023)	1,485	99,065
Spain (2018)	6,837	293,652
Sweden (2015)	370	20,595
Switzerland (2019)	206,061	12,211,950
UK (2013)	190,832	38,759,034
Total	1,489,745	179,058,511

Note: N/R=not reported.

*Cameroon did not destroy its stockpiled cluster munitions, but instead retained them all for research and training.

**Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

¹⁰⁹ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org. Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to adjusted information provided in Article 7 reports. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a collective total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions.

Six States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

- Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches.
- The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.¹¹⁰
- Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011 but did not provide information on the types or quantities.¹¹¹ It subsequently clarified in May 2022 and reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks.¹¹²
- Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017 but did not declare any cluster munitions as it destroyed its stockpile long before the convention's entry into force.¹¹³
- Nigeria reported in April 2023 and February 2024 that it does not possess any stockpiled cluster munitions.¹¹⁴ Previously, it requested technical assistance and cooperation to fulfill its stockpile destruction obligations.¹¹⁵

RETENTION

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

¹¹⁰ In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, it reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel landmines that were held for training and research purposes, following massive explosions at a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012. It reported that it was now a country free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011; statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs (CCBL), Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

¹¹¹ Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 January 2020; and statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-BissauSep2014. Guinea-Bissau told States Parties that it had asked for help to destroy its stockpile in 2013 from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had conducted a technical assessment in 2011 that found the cluster munition stocks were held by the armed forces "in very bad conditions." See, statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-Bissau11Sep2013. A 2011 inventory review by the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI) found that an air force base in Bissau City held stocks of cluster munitions. Interview with César Luis Gomes Lopes de Carvalho, General Director, CAAMI, in Geneva, 27 June 2011. RBK-series air-dropped bombs and PTAB-2.5 submunitions were among munitions ejected by an explosion at an ammunition storage facility on the outskirts of Bissau City in 2000. See, Cleared Ground Demining, "Guinea Bissau," undated, bit.ly/ClearedGroundGuinea-Bissau.

¹¹² Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2022, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauStatement19May2022; and Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 6 July 2022.

¹¹³ According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007, and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

¹¹⁴ Nigeria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B, C, and D, 28 February 2024.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, "Croatia Progress Report – monitoring progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan up to the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 6 October 2015, p. 15, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/CONF/2015/6; Statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012, bit.ly/NigeriaCCM11Sep2012.

A majority of States Parties see no need or reason to retain and use live cluster munitions for training purposes, including 29 States Parties that once possessed stocks: Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, and the UK.

However, a total of 10 States Parties are still retaining cluster munitions for training and research purposes, as listed below.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of 18 June 2024)¹¹⁶

State Party	Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)				Year first reported
	Currently retained	Consumed in 2023	Consumed in 2022	Initially retained	
Germany	98 (7,993)	31 (3,109)	22 (2,485)	685 (62,580)	2011
Switzerland	42 (2,097)	0 (62)	14 (798)	138 (7,346)	2013
Cameroon	6 (906)	N/R	0 (0)	6 (906)	2014
Bulgaria	5 (250)	1 (50)	0 (0)	8 (400)	2017
France	3 (189)	0 (1)	0 (0)	55 (10,284)	2011
Spain	2 (275)	0 (0)	5 (47)	711 (16,652)	2011
Denmark	0 (2,804)	0 (12)	0 (0)	170	2011
Netherlands	0 (1,854)	0 (0)	0 (0)	272 (23,545)	2011
Sweden	0 (92)	0 (0)	0 (8)	0 (125)	2013
BiH	0 (23)	0 (0)	0 (7)	0 (30)	2013

Note: N/R=not reported.

Germany is retaining the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party followed by Switzerland and Cameroon.

The number of States Parties retaining cluster munitions for research and training purposes has dropped to 10, after Belgium reported in April 2024 that its last stocks of retained cluster munitions “were neutralized (partially destroyed) in May 2023 and are therefore harmless.”¹¹⁷ Previously, in April 2023, Belgium reported that 95% of its retained cluster munitions had been destroyed and that it hoped to complete the destruction in 2023.

During 2023, five States Parties reported consuming cluster munitions for research and training purposes:

- Bulgaria reported in April 2024 that the total number of cluster munitions retained has been reduced to five 9N123K cluster munitions and 250 9N24 submunitions, after the Bulgarian Armed Forces consumed one cluster munition and 50 submunitions during training in 2023.¹¹⁸
- Denmark reported in May 2024 a lower number of cluster munitions retained for training but did not state in the report that 12 submunitions were consumed during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training in 2023.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

¹¹⁷ Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2024. Cluster Munition Monitor understands that the cluster munitions have been rendered inert and are incapable of being used, which means that Belgium no longer retains cluster munitions for research and training purposes.

¹¹⁸ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2024.

¹¹⁹ Denmark Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 23 May 2024.

- France reported in May 2024 that its technical experts from the armed forces destroyed one submunition on 20 April 2023.¹²⁰ However, it reported the same total number of cluster munitions and submunitions retained as previously reported in April 2023.
- Germany reported in March 2024 that the total number of cluster munitions retained has been reduced to 98 cluster munitions and 7,993 submunitions, after 31 cluster munitions and 3,109 submunitions were consumed during EOD training during 2023.¹²¹
- Switzerland reported in April 2024 that it consumed 62 DPICM submunitions in EOD training during 2023.¹²² It reported an increase in the total number of cluster munitions retained for training to 42 cluster munitions and 2,097 submunitions, after reporting the retention of 28 cluster munitions and 1,299 submunitions in April 2023. Cluster Munition Monitor has sought clarification from Switzerland on the reasons for this significant increase and received a response that Swiss officials are looking into it.¹²³

Five States Parties did not consume any retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes during 2023:

- BiH reported in April 2024 that it did not consume any retained cluster munitions during 2023.¹²⁴ It last consumed retained cluster munitions in 2022.
- Cameroon reported in June 2023 that it did not consume any retained cluster munitions during 2022 but, as of July 2024, had not provided an updated transparency report.¹²⁵ Cameroon's June 2023 report indicated no change in the status of its retained cluster munitions since its previous report submitted in 2017.
- The Netherlands reported in April 2024 that it did not consume any retained cluster munitions during 2023.¹²⁶ It last consumed retained cluster munitions in 2020.
- Spain reported in April 2024 that it did not consume any retained cluster munitions during 2023.¹²⁷ It last consumed retained cluster munitions in 2022.
- Sweden reported in April 2024 that it did not consume any retained cluster munitions during 2023.¹²⁸ It last consumed retained cluster munitions in 2022.

Most States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks significantly since making their initial declarations. This indicates that the initial amounts retained were not the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes under the convention.

Some States Parties, such as Belgium, Chile, Croatia, Moldova, and the Netherlands, have declared retaining inert items or those rendered free from explosives, which are no longer considered to be cluster munitions or submunitions under the convention.

¹²⁰ France Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 May 2024.

¹²¹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 28 March 2024.

¹²² Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2024.

¹²³ The 2024 total may be the result of a calculation error as Switzerland did not report the acquisition of any new cluster munitions for training and research purposes. The numbers provided in the April 2024 report appear to have been added up incorrectly and instead appear to total 28 cluster munitions and 1,488 submunitions retained for training in April 2024, which is a difference of 189 submunitions from the previous report.

¹²⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2024.

¹²⁵ Cameroon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 27 June 2023.

¹²⁶ Netherlands Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2024.

¹²⁷ Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2024.

¹²⁸ Sweden Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2024.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.¹²⁹

As of 1 August 2024, 106 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report, including the newest States Parties Nigeria and South Sudan.¹³⁰

States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 deadlines

State Party	Date due
Cabo Verde	28 September 2011
Comoros	30 June 2011
Congo, Rep. of	28 August 2015
Guinea	19 April 2015
Rwanda	31 July 2016
Togo	29 May 2013

Of the six States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 reports, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, and Togo are more than a decade overdue.

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year. Compliance with the annual reporting requirement has been sporadic, as more than half of States Parties do not provide Article 7 reports annually. Ten States Parties have not provided an annual update since submitting their initial Article 7 report.¹³¹

South Sudan provided four voluntary transparency reports for the convention before acceding in August 2023. In 2022, signatory DRC submitted its fourth voluntary Article 7 transparency report since 2011. Brunei Darussalam provided a voluntary submission in 2020. Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying the convention.

The CMC continues to encourage States Parties to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.¹³²

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

¹²⁹ The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at ccm@un.org. For more information, see, www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms.

¹³⁰ Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

¹³¹ Benin, Burundi, Fiji, Iceland, Mali, Nauru, Niue, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Sierra Leone.

¹³² Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply submit “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J to provide additional information.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention's entry into force in August 2010, a total of 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

Niue was the last country to enact national implementing legislation for the convention, in 2021. The Monitor is not aware of any State Party enacting implementation legislation for the convention during 2023 or the first half of 2024.

A total of 22 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.¹³³ This includes South Sudan, which reported in May 2024 that if it finds the necessary "legal, technical and financial support...a legal framework will be approved with penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any illegal activity under this Convention."¹³⁴

A total of 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹³⁵

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020.¹³⁶ HRW and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.¹³⁷ The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.¹³⁸ New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.¹³⁹

National implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party (year enacted)

Afghanistan (2018)	Italy (2011)
Australia (2012)	Japan (2009)
Austria (2008)	Liechtenstein (2013)
Belgium (2006)	Luxembourg (2009)
Bulgaria (2015)	Mauritius (2016)
Cameroon (2016)	Namibia (2019)
Canada (2014)	New Zealand (2009)
Colombia (2012)	Niue (2021)
Cook Islands (2011)	Norway (2008)
Czech Republic (2011)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014)
Ecuador (2010)	Samoa (2012)
France (2010)	Spain (2015)
Germany (2009)	Sweden (2012)
Guatemala (2012)	Switzerland (2012)
Hungary (2012)	Togo (2015)
Iceland (2015)	UK (2010)
Ireland (2008)	

¹³³ Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zambia.

¹³⁴ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 13 May 2024, p. 7. In its voluntary reports, South Sudan reported "no legal measures such as sanctions had been put in place to enforce South Sudan's implementation of the convention, as the parliament first needed to complete the accession approval process." See, South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (voluntary), Form A, 30 April 2023.

¹³⁵ Albania, Andorra, Benin, BiH, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

¹³⁶ CMC, "2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions: Model Legislation. Act to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 2020, bit.ly/CMCModelLegislation.

¹³⁷ HRW and IHRC, "Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation," September 2014, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

¹³⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Model Law: Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions," March 2013, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationICRC.

¹³⁹ New Zealand, "Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act," 7 September 2011, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationNZ2011.

INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

During the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the convention was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states' interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions ("interoperability");
2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.¹⁴⁰ Please refer to previous *Cluster Munition Monitor* reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stocks, and foreign stockpiling.¹⁴¹

INTEROPERABILITY AND THE PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE

Article 1 of the convention obliges States Parties "never under any circumstances to...assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention." Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these "interoperability" concerns, Article 21 on "Relations with States not Party to this Convention" was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties "may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party." It does not, however, negate States Parties' obligation under Article 1 to "never under any circumstances" assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by states not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions

¹⁴⁰ The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

¹⁴¹ As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions, that originated from 100 locations between 2003 and 2010.

and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

Therefore, States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party. Forms of prohibited assistance include, but are not limited to:

- Securing, storing, or transporting cluster munitions that belong to a state not party;
- Agreeing to rules of engagement that allow cluster munition use by a state not party;
- Accepting orders from a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Requesting a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Participating in planning for use of cluster munitions by a state not party; and
- Training others to use cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention's Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.¹⁴²

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention's Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties, along with Lithuania, used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

TRANSIT AND FOREIGN STOCKPILING

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 34 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2012* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2012), pp. 34–35, bit.ly/CMMonitor2012; CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009; and HRW and IHRC, “Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation,” 3 September 2014, pp. 19–23, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

¹⁴³ Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; and HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009.

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US STOCKPILING AND TRANSIT

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010. A July 2024 media report shows that cluster munitions held at a US base in Germany have been transferred to Ukraine since July 2023 as part of US military assistance, transiting across Germany and Poland in the process.¹⁴⁴

US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

DISINVESTMENT

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention's Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention's Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.¹⁴⁵

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party	Year enacted
Belgium	2007
Ireland	2008
Italy	2021
Liechtenstein	2013
Luxembourg	2009
Netherlands	2013
New Zealand	2009
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2014
Samoa	2012
Spain	2015
Switzerland	2013

Since 2007, a total of 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.¹⁴⁶

A few States Parties to the convention, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden, have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

Financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment in States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,

the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

Several private companies in non-signatory states have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.

¹⁴⁴ “Despite the ban: US cluster munitions in Germany – an investigation by Panorama and STRG_F,” *NDR*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/NDR25July2024.

¹⁴⁵ See, Action 47 in “Annex II: Lausanne Action Plan,” Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/CONF/2021/6, 6 October 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlanAnnexII.

¹⁴⁶ Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, and Zambia.

Timeline of cluster munition use¹⁴⁷

Date	Location	Known details of use
2022–present	Ukraine	The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions repeatedly in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. Ukrainian forces have used cluster munitions since March 2022. At least 13 types of cluster munitions have been used in Ukraine since 2022.
2022–present	Myanmar	Myanmar Armed Forces have used a domestically produced air-dropped cluster munition since 2022.
2012–present	Syria	Syrian Armed Forces used cluster munitions extensively in 2012–2020, while the attacks decreased but continued in 2021–2024. Russia has supported the Syrian government's cluster munition use since at least September 2015. Islamic State (IS) forces used at least one type of cluster munition in Syria.
2020	Azerbaijan, Armenia	Armenia and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions in the conflict over <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> in September–October 2020.
2015–2019	Libya	Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), formerly known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), used air-dropped cluster munitions in Tripoli in 2019. The Monitor was not able to conclusively attribute responsibility for cluster munition attacks reported between 2015 and 2018.
2015–2017	Yemen	A Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states, engaged in a military operation against Houthi forces in Yemen, used at least seven types of air-dropped and ground-fired cluster munitions in at least 23 attacks between 2015 and 2017.
2016	Azerbaijan, <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Two types of cluster munition rockets were used in April 2016, but the Monitor could not conclusively determine responsibility. Armenia and Azerbaijan both denied using cluster munitions and accused each other of using them.
2016	Somalia	Kenya denied an allegation that it used BL755 cluster munitions in Somalia in a January 2016 attack during a conflict against al-Shabaab forces.
2015	Sudan	The Sudanese Air Force was responsible for cluster munition attacks in Southern Kordofan in February, March, and May 2015 using RBK-500 AO-2.5 RT cluster bombs.
2014–2015	Ukraine	From July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire, Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed insurgent groups used two types of cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.
2014	South Sudan	In Jonglei state, the UN found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions by the road 16km south of Bor in February 2014, in an area not known to be contaminated by remnants before that time.

¹⁴⁷ For more detailed information, please see the relevant *Cluster Munition Monitor* country profiles online at: www.the-monitor.org. This accounting does not capture every location of cluster munitions use. Cluster munitions have been used in some countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear.


Date	Location	Known details of use
2012	Sudan	There were two compelling allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in Southern Kordofan state, involving a Chinese Type-81 DPICM in Troji on 29 February 2012 and a RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb in Ongolo on 15 April 2012.
2011	Libya	Libyan government forces used MAT-120 mortar-fired cluster munitions, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, and 122mm cargo rockets containing an unidentified type of DPICM.
2011	Cambodia	Thai forces fired artillery-delivered cluster munitions with M42/M46 and M85 type DPICM submunitions into Cambodia during border clashes near Preah Vihear temple.
2009	Yemen	The US used at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, to attack a “training camp” in Abyan governorate on 17 December 2009. Northern Saada governorate is contaminated by cluster munitions used in late 2009 during fighting by the government of Yemen, Houthi rebels, and Saudi Arabia. The user responsible is not clear, but remnants include US-made CBU-52 cluster bombs and BLU-97, BLU-61, and M42/M46 submunitions, as well as Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1Sch cluster bombs.
2008	Georgia	Russian and Georgian forces used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions cleared by deminers include air-dropped AO-2.5RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 and M095.
2006	Lebanon	Israeli forces used ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions in a conflict against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.
2006	Israel	Hezbollah forces fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.
2003	Iraq	The US and the UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions in the three weeks of major combat in 2003.
Unknown	Uganda	RBK-250-275 bombs and AO-1Sch submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.
2001–2002	Afghanistan	The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.
1999	Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in what is now Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, and in Albania. FRY also used cluster munitions.
1999	<i>Chechnya</i>	Russian forces used cluster munitions in a conflict against NSAGs.
1998–2003	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Deminers have found BL755 bombs, BLU-63 cluster munitions, and PM-1 submunitions.
1998–1999	Albania	Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and NATO forces conducted six aerial cluster munition strikes.

Date	Location	Known details of use
1998	Colombia	The Colombian Air Force used a World War II-era cluster munition in an attack on Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame on 13 December.
1998	Ethiopia, Eritrea	Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport and dropped BL755 bombs in Gash-Barka province in Eritrea. Eritrea used cluster munitions in two separate strikes in Mekele, including at a school.
1998	Afghanistan, Sudan	In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, at a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, and at reported NSAG training camps in Afghanistan.
1997	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian peacekeepers in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) used BLG-66 Beluga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu denied these reports.
1996–1999	Sudan	Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan.
1995	Croatia	An NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers in an attack on the city of Zagreb on 2–3 May. The Croatian government claimed that Serb forces used BL755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.
1994–1996	<i>Chechnya</i>	Russian forces used cluster munitions in a conflict against NSAGs.
1992–1997	Tajikistan	ShOAB-0.5 and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces in civil war.
1992–1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during the war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.
1992–1994	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> , Azerbaijan	Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> . Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and AO-2.5 RT. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> .
1992–1994	Angola	Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB and AO-2.5 RT submunitions in various locations.
1991	Iraq, Kuwait	The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.
1991	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions in the conflict against Iraqi forces during the Battle of Khafji.
1988	Iran	US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.
1986–1987	Chad	French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.

Date	Location	Known details of use
1986	Libya	US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on 25 March. On 14–15 April, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.
1984–1988	Iran, Iraq	It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped bombs in 1984. Iraq reportedly used Ababil-50 surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets during the later stages of the war.
1983	Lebanon	US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs in a conflict against Syrian air defense units near Beirut.
1983	Grenada	US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.
1982	<i>Falkland Islands/ Malvinas</i>	UK forces dropped 107 BL755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.
1982	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in a conflict against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.
1979–1989	Afghanistan	Soviet forces extensively used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.
1978	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.
1977–1978	Somalia	Contamination was discovered in 2013 in the Somali border region, including PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh submunitions, but the party responsible is unknown.
1975–1988	<i>Western Sahara, Mauritania</i>	Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions in a conflict against an NSAG in <i>Western Sahara</i> . Cluster munition remnants of the same types used by Morocco in <i>Western Sahara</i> have been found in Mauritania.
1973	Egypt, Syria	Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against Egyptian air defense installations in the Suez Canal zone and on reported NSAG training camps near Damascus.
1970s	Zambia	Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang'ombo.
1965–1975	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam	According to a Handicap International (HI) review of US bombing data, approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia in 1969–1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR in 1965–1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped in Vietnam in 1965–1975.
1939–1945	Italy, Libya, Malta, Palau, Solomon Islands, USSR, the UK, possibly other locations	Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by belligerent parties during World War II in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific.

Note: other areas are indicated in *italics*; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS




MAP KEY

- States Parties (112)
- Signatories (12)
- Non-signatories (73)

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS



MAP KEY


- Current producer
- Past producer

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, signatories are underlined, non-signatories are plain text.

DISCLAIMER

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CLUSTER MUNITION STOCKPILES AND DESTRUCTION





A Humanity & Inclusion (HI) deminer works on steep, contaminated farmland in Houaphanh province, Lao PDR.

© Anna Phommachanthone/Legacies of War, August 2023

THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This overview details the harmful impacts caused by cluster munitions. It charts the efforts and challenges facing States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have obligations to clear cluster munition remnants and to assist cluster munition victims.¹ This overview assesses progress on the strategic commitments made by States Parties under the five-year Lausanne Action Plan, adopted at the convention's Second Review Conference in September 2021.² It also considers States Parties' overarching commitment "to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions" as stated in the convention's preamble.³ It includes annual data on casualties, contamination, clearance, and risk education beneficiaries for calendar year 2023, as well as updates on progress through 1 August 2024 where relevant and available.⁴

1 Cluster munition remnants include abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions, and unexploded bomblets, as well as failed cluster munitions. Unexploded submunitions are "explosive submunitions" that have been dispersed or released from a cluster munition but failed to explode as intended. Unexploded bomblets are similar to unexploded submunitions, but refer to "explosive bomblets," which have been dispersed or released from an affixed aircraft dispenser and failed to explode as intended. Abandoned cluster munitions are unused explosive submunitions or cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped, and are no longer under the control of the party that abandoned them. The term cluster munition victims means "all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions." Cluster munition victims include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions; those injured (survivors) or killed, as well as affected families and communities. Cluster munition survivors are persons who were injured by cluster munitions or their explosive remnants and lived. Most cluster munition survivors are also persons with disabilities. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 2 (1), (5), (6), (7), and (15).

2 Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Lausanne Action Plan," September 2021, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

3 Casualties mean people killed and injured, including those for whom the survival outcome is not known.

4 Unless otherwise stated, findings draw from detailed country profiles that are available on the Monitor's website. See, Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org. See also 2010-2022 archived country profiles, bit.ly/MonitorArchives2; and 1999-2014 archived country profiles, bit.ly/MonitorArchives1.

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES AND IMPACTS

In 2023, despite a significant decrease in total cluster munition casualty figures compared to the massive spike of the previous year, the threat from cluster munitions and cluster munition remnants remained grave. Cluster munition attacks directly impacted schools and hospitals. Unexploded submunitions continued to endanger civilians, especially children. They also severely impeded access to agricultural land, impacting food security, particularly in Ukraine, where there is indication that more agricultural land is contaminated by cluster munition remnants than by antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines combined.⁵

Cluster munition attacks and cluster munition remnants resulted in 219 recorded casualties across nine countries in 2023. Ukraine saw the highest number of casualties globally for the second consecutive year. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than a thousand cluster munition casualties have been recorded.

PROGRESS IN CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

State Party Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) completed clearance of cluster munition remnants in August 2023, meeting a core requirement of Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

While Chile commenced long-planned clearance operations, only State Party Lao PDR picked up the pace of clearing cluster munition remnants. The clearance of cluster munition remnants in other States Parties was below their 2022 performance. Clearance was particularly affected by an overall lack of national funding that has still not returned to pre-COVID-19 levels, while international funding priorities have shifted to Ukraine.⁶

As of the end of 2023, 10 States Parties—including South Sudan, which acceded to the Convention on 3 August 2023—were still contaminated by cluster munition remnants; while two signatories, 14 non-signatories, and two other areas—Kosovo and Western Sahara—have, or are believed to have, areas containing cluster munition remnants.

States Parties reported that 92.04km² of cluster munition contaminated land was released via clearance, technical survey, and non-technical survey during 2023, resulting in the destruction of at least 73,348 cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets.⁷

Of the total land released in 2023, 83.91km² was cleared, a decrease from the 93.49km² cleared in 2022 but still a significant increase compared to the 61km² cleared in 2021. After conducting technical survey of its contaminated areas during 2021, Chile began clearance in 2023.⁸ Chad has yet to survey and commence clearance operations.⁹

Requests by States Parties to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines have been made every year since the first extension requests were submitted in 2019. At the convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2023, States Parties granted Article 4 deadline

⁵ Col. Ruslan Berehulia, Head of the National Mine Action Authority Secretariat, "Ukraine: Meeting Food Security Needs Through Mine Action," side event panel, 27th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

⁶ International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), pp. 85–105, bit.ly/LM2023Report.

⁷ For South Sudan, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and South Sudan's clearance obligations, came into force on 1 February 2024. However, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 7, it was obliged to submit an initial report for calendar year 2023 by 30 July 2024. South Sudan submitted the report on time, making some information for 2023 available at the time of this report. If not stated differently, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* includes figures reported by South Sudan for 2023.

⁸ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, 25 April 2024, p. 6; response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024; and Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 May 2022, pp. 6–7, bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022.

⁹ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), 17 May 2024, pp. 3–4. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024.

extensions to Iraq and Mauritania.¹⁰ In the first half of 2024, Chad, Germany, and Lao PDR had submitted their second extension request for their current Article 4 deadlines. Chad requested two years to October 2026, and Germany and Lao PDR requested five years to August 2030.¹¹ Actions on the three requests will be decided at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2024.

Only Somalia and the newly acceded State Party South Sudan are working towards their original 10-year clearance deadline under Article 4. However, Somalia has not reported any cluster munition clearance over the past five years and does not appear to be on target to meet its deadline. As of 1 August 2024, Somalia had not yet reported on cluster munition clearance for 2023.

RISK EDUCATION IN RESPONSE TO RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR

Men and boys involved in activities such as farming, tending livestock, scrap metal collection, or entering hazardous areas for the collection of firewood and other natural resources remained the main groups at risk from harm from cluster munition remnants in 2023.

All affected States Parties have a risk education mechanism in place except Chile and Germany, where the cluster munition contaminated areas are on military land that is inaccessible to the public. Risk education activities were implemented in 2023 by all contaminated States Parties, except for Chile and Germany.

CHALLENGES IN PROVIDING ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS

Efforts to provide victim assistance under the Convention on Cluster Munitions saw progress, but most States Parties encountered significant challenges in providing adequate, accessible services. States Parties remain reliant on diminishing international aid for these initiatives. Crises in Afghanistan and Lebanon have severely compromised healthcare systems, with reports of discrimination compounding these impacts. Specifically, women and girls experienced significantly reduced access to healthcare in Afghanistan. Syrian refugees faced barriers to access healthcare in Lebanon due to intimidation, restrictions on freedom of movement, and threats of deportation. Limited advances in access to socio-economic inclusion programs and the provision of financial assistance to victims meant that the level of need remained severely under-addressed. Although psychological support continued, peer-to-peer support was still insufficient despite the widely acknowledged necessity for effective and sustainable services.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

GLOBAL CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

The Monitor recorded a global total of 24,502 cluster munition casualties—people killed and injured—by the end of 2023. This figure encompasses casualties from both direct cluster munition attacks (5,767) and unexploded cluster munition remnants (18,734).¹² The Monitor's global cluster munition casualty count dates to the mid-1960s, with the extensive use of cluster bombs by the United States (US) in Southeast Asia. As many

¹⁰ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties," 29 September 2023, pp. 3–4, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

¹¹ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024; Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 June 2024, bit.ly/LaosArt4ExtRequest2024.

¹² For one casualty in Montenegro, the cause was not recorded.

casualties go unrecorded, global cluster munition casualties may be as high as 56,800, a figure calculated from a review of multiple datasets and individual country estimates.¹³

As of the end of 2023, cluster munition casualties have been recorded in 16 States Parties to the convention, four signatory states, 17 non-signatories, and two other areas.

The states with the highest number of casualties, for all time, in the Monitor dataset are: Lao PDR (7,810), Syria (4,445), Iraq (3,201), Vietnam (2,135), and Ukraine (1,123).

States and other areas with cluster munition casualties (as of 31 December 2023)¹⁴

More than 1,000 casualties	100–1,000 casualties	10–99 casualties	Less than 10 casualties/unknown
Iraq Lao PDR Syria Ukraine Vietnam	Afghanistan <u>Angola</u> Azerbaijan BiH Cambodia Croatia <u>DRC</u> Eritrea Ethiopia <i>Kosovo</i> Kuwait Lebanon Russia Serbia South Sudan* <i>Western Sahara</i> Yemen	Albania Colombia Georgia Israel Myanmar Sierra Leone Sudan Tajikistan <u>Uganda</u>	Chad Guinea-Bissau <u>Liberia</u> Libya Mauritania Montenegro Mozambique Somalia

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

*South Sudan acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in August 2023. The convention entered into force on 1 February 2024.

Not all States Parties with cluster munition casualties recorded on their territory have acknowledged the application of the Convention on Cluster Munitions obligation regarding victim assistance.

Cluster munition casualties have been reported in Colombia and Mozambique, but neither have themselves reported any cluster munition victims and therefore do not recognize the application of the obligation to assist victims under the convention.¹⁵ The convention entered into force for Colombia on 1 March 2016. In November 2017, the Supreme Court of

¹³ Other global estimates have put the total number of cluster munition casualties for all time at 86,600 to 100,000. Yet, these are based on extrapolations from limited data samples, which may not be representative of national averages or the actual number of casualties calculated by the Monitor based on known data and various country estimates recorded in Humanity & Inclusion (HI) data. See, HI, *Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007.

¹⁴ No numbers or estimated casualty totals are known for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, or Mozambique. No cluster munition victims have been reported by Chile, yet media reporting in 2021 on two survivors of a military explosive remnants of war (ERW) incident in 1995 described the item as a cluster munition remnant. These would be the first recorded cluster munition casualties in Chile. It is possible that cluster munition casualties have occurred but gone unrecorded in other states where cluster munitions were used, abandoned, or stored in the past, such as State Party Zambia and non-signatories Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Better identification and disaggregation of cluster munition casualties is needed in most cluster munition affected states and areas.

¹⁵ Colombia and Mozambique are both party to the Mine Ban Treaty and have recognized their responsibility to assist landmine survivors.

Colombia upheld the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) case, *Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia*, regarding redress for cluster munition victims of an attack in 1998.¹⁶ The IACHR prescribed measures for remedy that are essentially consistent with the victim assistance obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹⁷

Casualties that occurred in Mozambique due to cluster munition attacks by Rhodesia were likely predominantly Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) forces.¹⁸ Previously, Mozambique reported on victim assistance efforts under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and stated that “additional surveys are needed to identify victims of cluster munitions.”¹⁹ No such surveys were reported. However, in its most recent Article 7 report from 2020, Mozambique said that “at the moment there is no evidence of victims of cluster munitions.”²⁰

The majority of recorded cluster munition casualties for all time (54%, or 13,187) occurred in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

A total of 604 casualties have been recorded in signatories Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Uganda.

In non-signatory states, a total of 10,294 cluster munition casualties were recorded for all time up to the end of 2023. Since the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, casualties from cluster munition attacks have only occurred in non-signatory states, namely Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

In other areas where cluster munition casualties have occurred, a total of 417 casualties were recorded for all time. This includes Kosovo and Western Sahara, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh, which was reported as an ‘other area’ in the Monitor up until the present report. Nagorno-Karabakh was depopulated by mass exodus of the existing inhabitants when Azerbaijan gained territorial control in 2023, making it unlikely that any living cluster munition victims remain in the area.²¹

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2023

In 2023, casualties from cluster munition attacks and unexploded submunitions were recorded in a total of nine countries.²² Casualties from attacks were recorded in three non-signatory states while casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in eight countries, including four States Parties and four non-signatories. Cluster munition remnants continue to pose a significant threat, disproportionately affecting civilians. Children are especially vulnerable to unexploded submunitions.

¹⁶ Supreme Court of the Republic of Colombia, “César Romero Pradilla vs. Johan Jiménez Valencia,” 23 November 2017.

¹⁷ All casualties occurred at the time of the attack and no unexploded submunition casualties have been reported in Colombia. As identified in Case No. 12.416 (*Santo Domingo Massacre vs. the Republic of Colombia*) heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition attack in Santo Domingo, Colombia, on 13 December 1998. IACHR, “Case of The Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (Preliminary objections, merits and reparations): Judgement of November 30, 2012,” 30 November 2012, bit.ly/IACHRColombia30Nov2012. See also, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Colombia, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre,” undated, bit.ly/ICRCSantoDomingo2012.

¹⁸ Peter J. H. Petter-Bowyer, *Winds of destruction: the autobiography of a Rhodesian combat pilot*. (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2003); and “The Struggle For Land in Zimbabwe (1890–2010)...alpha bombs as Rhodes attack Chimoi,” *The Patriot*, 1 June 2017 (no longer available online).

¹⁹ See, for example, Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2010), Form H; and Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), Form H.

²⁰ Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H.

²¹ The self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ceased to exist as of January 2024 and Nagorno-Karabakh is no longer addressed as an ‘other area’ in the context of mine action in Monitor reporting. See also, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Nagorno-Karabakh Depopulated: What Now?,” Daily Brief, 5 October 2023, bit.ly/HRWDailyBrief5Oct2023.

²² There was also report of one civilian casualty due to alleged cluster munition attacks in Russia in 2023. This has not been included in the annual totals for this report.

For 2023, the Monitor recorded a total of 219 cluster munition casualties.²³ Ukraine continued to have the highest number of annual casualties of cluster munitions for the second consecutive year. Since February 2022, a total of 1,023 cluster munition casualties were recorded for Ukraine, including 980 casualties from attacks as well as 43 casualties from cluster munition remnants, so far identified through the end of 2023.

The total number of casualties for 2023 is likely significantly higher. Although the Monitor adjusts casualty data over time as new information becomes available, limited access to conflict-affected regions and inconsistencies in reporting make it difficult to draw definitive trends from annual casualty totals in the short term.

Casualties from numerous cluster munition use in Ukraine in 2023 could have gone unrecorded. Monitor analysis of data from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) indicates that more than 50 cluster munition attacks in Ukraine were reported in 2023 where the number of casualties that occurred was not noted. These attacks were differentiated from attacks where it was reported that there were no casualties, and other attacks where claims of unsubstantiated or unspecified enemy military casualties were made. In addition to these attacks, ACLED event descriptions included unconfirmed information from multiple sources, including Russian government sources, which reported 870 Ukrainian military personnel killed in around six cluster munitions attacks during battle events in 2023.²⁴ These casualties were not included in the Monitor total. ACLED data from Ukrainian and other sources, including social media, indicated a similar number of battle events where Ukrainian use of cluster munitions in 2023 was reported to have resulted in many Russian soldiers being killed, but without specifying or estimating the number of military casualties.²⁵

Casualties from cluster munition attacks in 2023

Since Cluster Munition Monitor reporting began, all casualties from cluster munition attacks have occurred in non-signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2023, casualties from attacks occurred in non-signatories Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine.

In Ukraine, the Monitor recorded 90 casualties from cluster munition attacks in 2023, for a total of at least 980 casualties from when Russia's full invasion began on 24 February 2022 through to the end of 2023. Similarly, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported that, in the two years since February 2022, cluster munitions attacks had caused 996 civilian casualties in Ukraine, "with casualties occurring on both sides of the frontline."²⁶ HRMMU noted that civilian conflict casualty numbers overall were particularly high during the first few months after the invasion, with the numbers gradually decreasing over the course of 2022 and 2023. In reporting on the situation during the first half of 2023, HRMMU noted that cluster munitions "caused dozens of civilian casualties in government-



A farmer who suffered two cluster munition explosions in 2006 and 2007 while picking herbs and grazing his sheep in Al Abbasiyeh in Lebanon's South governorate. The contamination hinders the local communities' ability to farm their land.

© Arne Hodalič/ITF Enhancing Human Security, May 2023

²³ The Monitor systematically collects data from a wide array of sources including national reports, mine action centers, clearance operators, victim assistance providers, and national and international media organizations.

²⁴ Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2023. See, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, Issue 5, September 2010, pp. 651–660, bit.ly/IntroducingACLEDSept2010.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Two-Year Update. Protection of civilians: impact of hostilities on civilians since 24 February 2022," update as of 15 February 2024, bit.ly/OHCHR15Feb2024.

controlled territory. The use of cluster munitions in populated areas poses significant risks to civilians, due to their indiscriminate and potentially disproportionate effects, and the high risk of unexploded submunitions.”²⁷

In Myanmar, cluster munitions used in aerial attacks by Myanmar Armed Forces caused at least 13 casualties in 2023.²⁸

In Syria, cluster munition shelling attacks in October 2023 caused 15 casualties.²⁹

Casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2023

In 2023, 101 casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine. The number of annual casualties caused by cluster munition remnants decreased compared to 2022 and 2021.

In non-signatory Yemen, 30 cluster munition remnants casualties were recorded for 2023. This represents a significant reduction from 95 in 2022—however, 2022 was marked by a steep increase from 29 in 2021, and 11 in 2020. The decrease compared to 2022 also corresponds with an overall annual reduction in casualties due to mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) in the country.

State Party Iraq reported 26 cluster munition remnants casualties in 2023, 41 in 2022, 33 in 2021, and 31 in 2020.

In non-signatory Ukraine, 17 cluster munition remnants casualties were recorded in 2023 and 26 in 2022. No cluster munition remnants casualties had been recorded in 2021.³⁰

In non-signatory Syria, 13 casualties were recorded in 2023, 15 in 2022, and 37 in 2021.³¹



In 2024, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been clearing contaminated areas in West Bekaa, Lebanon where Salim, a shepherd lost more than 10 sheep due to cluster munition remnants explosions. His friend lost a leg.

© MAG, April 2024

State Party Lao PDR recorded eight cluster munition remnants casualties in 2023 and nine casualties in 2022, a significant reduction from 30 in 2021.

In State Party Lebanon, three casualties were recorded in 2023 and five in 2022, a continuing decrease from eight in 2021. One of the three casualties in 2023 and four of the five casualties in 2021 were Syrians.

State Party Mauritania recorded three cluster munition remnants casualties in 2023, having only had two casualties previously reported in 2021.

In non-signatory Azerbaijan, one casualty from an unexploded submunition was recorded in 2023, compared to three in 2022 and one in 2021.

CIVILIAN CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

Civilians accounted for 93% (203 of 219) of all casualties recorded for 2023, where the status was recorded. Of the total casualties recorded for 2023, just 16 casualties were military personnel. The high ratio of civilian casualties from cluster munitions is

²⁷ United Nations (UN), “Head of UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine presents the latest human rights report,” 6 October 2023, bit.ly/HRMMU6Oct2023.

²⁸ ICBL-CMC, “Briefing Paper Cluster Munition Production and Use in Myanmar/Burma, August 2023: Tracking progress toward a world free of landmines and cluster munitions,” 31 Aug 2023; Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2023; and Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Military should be investigated for war crimes in response to ‘Operation 1027,’” 21 December 2023, bit.ly/AmnestyMyanmar21Dec2023.

²⁹ Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2023; and HRW, “Northwest Syria: Government Uses Cluster Munitions,” 5 November 2023, bit.ly/HRWSyria5Nov2023.

³⁰ Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2023; and Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2023.

³¹ For Syria, an additional nine cluster munition remnants casualties were recorded for 2022 following the publication of *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023*, where only six were originally reported.

consistent with the indiscriminate nature of these weapons and their disproportionate impact. However, as noted above, many claims of extensive military casualties of cluster munitions during battles in Ukraine were reported but remained unsubstantiated.

Information on the casualties that occurred during cluster munition attacks often contained less details about the sex and age of those killed and injured than for casualties caused by cluster munition remnants. Overall, in 2023, sex and age disaggregated data was severely lacking. However, at least five casualties were women. In 2023, 54 child casualties from cluster munitions were recorded, including 47 child casualties from cluster munition remnants and seven child casualties due to cluster munition attacks. Seven casualties were girls and 12 were boys, where the age and sex were reported. Children accounted for 26% of civilian casualties and 47% of casualties from cluster munition remnants, and made up the majority of casualties from cluster munition remnants in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

CONTAMINATION FROM CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

GLOBAL CONTAMINATION

A total of 26 states and two other areas are known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants as of 31 December 2023, as shown in the following table. Of these contaminated states, 10 are States Parties, two are signatories, 14 are non-signatories, and two are other areas.³²

Estimated cluster munition remnant contamination (as of 31 December 2023)³³

Massive (more than 1,000km ²)	Large (100– 1,000km ²)	Medium (10–99km ²)	Small (less than 10km ²)	Unknown
Lao PDR Vietnam	Cambodia Iraq	Azerbaijan Chad Chile Mauritania South Sudan* Syria Ukraine Yemen	Afghanistan Georgia Germany Iran <i>Kosovo</i> Lebanon Libya Serbia Somalia Sudan Tajikistan <i>Western Sahara</i>	<u>Angola</u> Armenia <u>DRC</u> Kuwait

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.
*South Sudan acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in August 2023. South Sudan's Article 4 clearance obligations entered into force on 1 February 2024.

³² Nagorno-Karabakh—formerly listed as an other area—is now considered part of the territory of Azerbaijan, as it ceased to exist as of January 2024. See, Piotr Sauer, “Nagorno-Karabakh’s breakaway government says it will dissolve itself,” *The Guardian*, 28 September 2023, bit.ly/TheGuardian28Sept2023; and Laurens Broers, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: The life and death of an unrecognized state,” *Eurasianet*, 2 January 2024, bit.ly/Eurasianet2Jan2024.

³³ The extent of contamination is unknown but assumed to be small for Angola and Armenia. Based on evidence of extensive use of cluster munitions in Syria and Ukraine, it is believed that both countries suffer from at least a medium contamination level. However, in both countries no comprehensive surveys have been conducted yet that would allow a more exact estimation of the extent of the contamination. Nagorno-Karabakh, after its formal dissolution as of 1 January 2024, is included in the reporting on the overall territory under the jurisdiction and control of Azerbaijan. According to a survey by The HALO Trust, the contamination was estimated to be more than 16km². Despite some clearance work conducted by The HALO Trust, the extent of the remaining cluster munition contamination—including in other areas in Azerbaijan—is believed to be medium.

BiH has been removed from the Monitor's list of affected States Parties after it declared completion of its clearance obligations in August 2023. South Sudan is now a State Party with clearance obligations since February 2024.

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

States Parties that have completed clearance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

BiH reported completion of clearance of cluster munition remnants in August 2023.³⁴ Prior to this, the most recent States Parties to complete clearance were Croatia and Montenegro in 2020.

States Parties that have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants

State Party	Year of completion
Albania	2009
BiH	2023
Croatia	2020
Grenada	2012
Guinea-Bissau	2008
Montenegro	2020
Mozambique	2016
Norway	2013
Palau	2010
Republic of the Congo	2012
Zambia	2010

In all, a total of 11 States Parties have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants as required by the convention.³⁵

Extent of contamination in States Parties

The Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as Action 18 of the Lausanne Action Plan, requires that States Parties identify the precise location, scope, and extent of cluster munition contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control. The Lausanne Action Plan also requires contaminated States Parties to establish accurate, evidence-based contamination baselines, to the fullest extent possible, no later than the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 2022, or within two years after entry into force of the convention for new States Parties.

As of the end of 2023, five States Parties—Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan—had a clear understanding of their contamination, having conducted evidence-based surveys. In Lao PDR and Mauritania, survey was still ongoing.³⁶ States Parties Afghanistan and Chad still have to establish a clear understanding of the extent of contamination, while Somalia had not provided any updates on the extent of contamination as of 1 August 2024.

In **Chile**, contamination from cluster munition remnants is limited to land on an army base and three ranges used for military training by the Chilean Air Force. As of the end of 2023,

³⁴ The figures in BiH's Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2023 suggest that 56,845m² remain contaminated based on the reported figures for contamination (548,504m²) and subsequent land release (491,659m²). See, BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 13–15. However, BiH declared completion of its clearance obligations in August 2023. See, BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 14; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country profiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina," 25 June 2024, bit.ly/CCMBiHProfile.

³⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country profiles," undated, www.clusterconvention.org/country-profiles.

³⁶ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 15–16; Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 13–14; response to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Manager, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 20 May 2024; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 6, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023.

the remaining contamination across the four different sites totaled 29.34km².³⁷ In 2022, Chile was granted a deadline extension under Article 4 to clear its remaining contamination from 2023–2026.³⁸

In **Germany**, a former military training site in Wittstock, 80km northwest of Berlin, is known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. In March 2024, Germany reported that 4.41km² are still contaminated and will be cleared by 1 August 2030, a new deadline proposed in Germany's second Article 4 extension request to be considered in September 2024.³⁹

In **Iraq**, the Regional Mine Action Center for the south of the country (RMAC South) reported that, as of March 2024, cluster munition remnants affected a total area of 189.5km² across the four southern governorates of Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. The highest level of contamination is in Muthanna governorate (90.12km²). The RMAC in the Middle Euphrates region reported 4.76km² of contamination, while RMAC North reported 11.51km². Nationally, Iraq's cluster munition remnant contamination therefore totals 205.77km².⁴⁰ This represents an increase of 16.17km² from the 2022 total, due to newly discovered and surveyed contaminated areas.⁴¹ Initial information was received of one suspected hazardous area (SHA) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which covers the governorates of Duhok, Erbil, Halabja, and Sulaymaniyah. However, further details had not been reported as of 1 August 2024.⁴²

In **Lebanon**, the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) reported that as of the end of 2023, cluster munition remnant contamination totaled 4.65km² of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and South Lebanon. With no new contamination identified in 2023, the total reported by LMAC marks a decrease of 0.66km² since 2022, due to land release activities.⁴³

South Sudan reported a total of 10.19km² of cluster munition remnant contamination, with 9.35km² classified as CHA and 0.84km² as SHA as of the end of 2023. This almost doubles the figure reported in 2022, despite South Sudan releasing 4.32km² of contaminated land in 2023. The increase is attributed to a recalculation of existing contamination, as well as the identification of previously unknown cluster munition contaminated areas.⁴⁴



A clearance operator from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) uses a large-loop detector to search for cluster munition remnants in an orange orchard in Al Makiyeh in Lebanon's South governorate.

© Arne Hodalič/ITF Enhancing Human Security, May 2023

³⁷ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 4–6; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024.

³⁸ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” 19 September 2022, p. 5, bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport.

³⁹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 21; and Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, pp. 55–56, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024.

⁴⁰ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 26.

⁴¹ Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 20 May 2024.

⁴² Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 27.

⁴³ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 16; response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), 8 April 2024; Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 15; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2022 and 8 May 2023.

⁴⁴ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 25 April 2024; and by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 17 April 2023.



A submunition found by a Humanity & Inclusion (HI) clearance team is waiting to be detonated in Houaphanh province, Lao PDR.

© Anna Phommachanthone/Legacies of War, August 2023

Lao PDR is the State Party most heavily contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Of the country's 18 provinces, 15 are contaminated, nine heavily.⁴⁵ As of the end of 2023, the extent of CHA in Lao PDR was reported to be 1,502.08km² across 15 provinces, however, survey was still ongoing at the time.⁴⁶

Mauritania conducted an initial assessment in 2021 that found 14.01km² of land contaminated with cluster munition remnants in the region of Tiris Zemmour in the north, bordering Western Sahara.⁴⁷ Mauritania has reported that further survey is required to determine the full extent of the contamination and, in early 2023, requested a two-year extension through 1 August 2026 to its Article 4 clearance deadline, which was granted in September 2023.⁴⁸ As of December 2023, following the conduct of non-technical survey, Mauritania had identified two new SHAs sized 2.28km², resulting in a new total extent of cluster munition contamination of 16.3km² consisting of BLU-63 and Mk 118 submunitions.⁴⁹

Afghanistan reported that a total of 9.28km² of land is contaminated by cluster munition remnants, covering 16 areas across the provinces of Faryab, Nangarhar, Paktya, and Samangan, as of the end of 2023.⁵⁰ Eleven of these areas were identified by survey in 2021. Since the Taliban takeover of the country in 2022, certain areas that were formerly deemed inaccessible due to insecurity can apparently now be reached.⁵¹ However, a decrease in donor funding over recent years is limiting significant progress in clearance and the land release process.⁵²

⁴⁵ Survey is complete in Attapeu, Champasak, Salavan, Savannakhet, and Sekong provinces. In Xieng Khouang, survey is still ongoing. In Bolikhamxai, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane, survey is being undertaken although not systematically. A further 0.53km² of CHA has been identified in Phongsaly. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), Part B Detailed Narrative, 10 June 2024, p. 8, bit.ly/LaosArt4ExtRequest2024.

⁴⁶ The Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), p. 7, identifies the total remaining CHA to be 1,963.78km². However, the Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), Part B Detailed Narrative, 10 June 2024, p. 8, identifies the remaining CHA to be 1,502.08km² (1,843.62km² minus a total of 341.54km² cleared as of the end of December 2023). For this overview, the figures as provided in the extension request have been considered.

⁴⁷ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

⁴⁸ Ibid.; Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 3, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties," 29 September 2023, p. 4, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

⁴⁹ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 13–14; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

⁵⁰ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 33; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 27 April 2024.

⁵¹ Afghanistan reported that due to "the change of government and takeover of new regime, all the area is fortunately secure now and ready for conducting survey and clearance operations." Statement of Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan], Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 May 2022, bit.ly/AfghanistanStatement16May2022.

⁵² Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 34; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Habib Rahimi, Operations Manager, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

Chad reported in June 2021 that the last area known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants had been cleared.⁵³ However, Tibesti province, in the northwest of Chad, which is suspected to contain cluster munition contamination around former Libyan military bases, had not yet been surveyed.⁵⁴ In 2022, Chad submitted an Article 4 deadline extension request through 1 October 2024 to conduct non-technical survey of 19.05km² in Tibesti. A lack of funding saw no survey activities conducted during 2023, and in January 2024 Chad submitted its second Article 4 deadline extension request which sought to extend the deadline to 2026.⁵⁵

In **Somalia**, the total extent of contamination is believed to be small, with only 600m² identified in the states of Jubaland, Galmudug, and South West, as of September 2023.⁵⁶ The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported in 2021 that cluster munition remnants may also have been collected and used as components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs).⁵⁷ As of 1 August 2024, Somalia had not provided any updates on contamination.

Possible contamination in States Parties

In May 2009, **Colombia's** then defense minister and later president, Juan Manuel Santos, acknowledged that the Colombian Military Forces had used cluster munitions in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups,” and noted that the submunitions sometimes did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.”⁵⁸ In 2010, the Ministry of National Defense said that the Colombian Air Force last used cluster munitions on 10 October 2006 “to destroy clandestine airstrips belonging to organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in remote areas of the country where the risk to civilians was minimal.”⁵⁹ When the convention entered into force for Colombia in 2016, Colombia reported that it was in the process of establishing the location and extent of any cluster munition contamination.⁶⁰ In 2017, Colombia stated that it had no cluster munition remnant contamination, yet no survey was undertaken to confirm this.⁶¹ In 2021, a study reported that contamination was a possibility since the Colombian Air Force had acquired two types of cluster bombs in the 1990s: the CB-250K from Chile and the ARC-32 from Israel. Yet no sufficient information on their use was available prior to ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and subsequent stockpile destruction.⁶² In 2023, as in previous years, Colombia did not confirm any contamination on its territory.⁶³

⁵³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 18 June 2021; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F, p. 5.

⁵⁴ Emails from Romain Coupepe, Regional Security Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 10 May 2017 and 31 May 2018; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Romain Coupepe, Regional Security Manager, MAG, 3 May 2017.

⁵⁵ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 5; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024.

⁵⁶ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 5.

⁵⁷ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F, p. 8; and responses to Monitor questionnaire and follow-up questions by Hussein Ibrahim Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS Somalia, 27 August and 21 September 2021.

⁵⁸ Carlos Osorio, “Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs,” *Agence France-Presse*, 7 May 2009.

⁵⁹ Colombia Ministry of National Defense presentation on cluster munitions, Bogotá, December 2010.

⁶⁰ Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, August 2016 (initial report), Form F; and Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

⁶¹ Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F; and email from Camilo Serna, Sub-Director, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM), 30 July 2020.

⁶² Carlos Andrés Soler Palomino, “Technical Study of the cluster munitions used by the Colombian Air Force: strategic guidelines for the compliance with Article 4 of the Oslo Convention,” Postgraduate School of the Colombian Air Force, 2021.

⁶³ Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 13–15.

In 2023, the **United Kingdom** (UK) did not report any contamination on its territory. However, it is estimated that more than 2,000 crates of AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 'cluster adapter' type bombs and some 800 fused cluster bombs remain in UK waters.⁶⁴ These are located at Sheerness off the east coast of England in the cargo of a sunken World War II ship.⁶⁵ The wreck is in a no-entry exclusion zone and under constant radar surveillance. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency undertakes regular surveys and has reported that the wreck is showing evidence of gradual deterioration but is considered to be in a stable condition.⁶⁶ However, in April 2024, media reported that ongoing safety works on the wreck have been delayed due to the detection of unidentified objects around the wreck site, requiring further investigation.⁶⁷

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CONTAMINATION IN SIGNATORIES

Two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—Angola and the DRC—may be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but the extent of contamination is unknown.

Angola has not reported any areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in its transparency reports. However, in previous years, cluster munition remnants have been found and destroyed through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs. Under its Mine Ban Treaty obligations, Angola reported that 7,520 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and 16,721 items of abandoned ordnance (AXO) were cleared and destroyed in 2023, but did not specify if any were cluster munition remnants.⁶⁸

The **DRC** consistently reported a total of 0.16km² of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants from 2013 to 2021. The contamination has been primarily from Mk 118 and PM1 submunitions and was reported to be located in the provinces of Equateur, Ituri, South-Kivu, and Tanganyika. At the same time, it was reported that cluster munition contaminated land had been released in these provinces, but also in Maniema and Tshopo.⁶⁹ Yet, in September 2023, the DRC provided a significantly higher estimate of the extent of contamination (18.24km²).⁷⁰ In June 2024, no figures were provided but Ituri province was removed, and Tshuapa province was added to the list of contaminated provinces, highlighting the importance of survey to clarify the exact extent and location of contamination.⁷¹

⁶⁴ Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "Report on the Wreck of the SS Richard Montgomery," May 1999, bit.ly/SSMontgomeryReport1999; and Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "SS Richard Montgomery: background information," updated 16 July 2024, bit.ly/MaritimeCoastguardAgency16Jul2024.

⁶⁵ The SS Richard Montgomery, carrying a cargo of munitions, was shipwrecked off the Thames Estuary, near Sheerness, in August 1944 and remains submerged there. The former UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency has listed best estimates of the munitions which remain aboard the ship, including 2,297 cases of fragmentation cluster bombs with AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 "cluster adapter" submunitions. Reports indicate that the wreck is generally stable but is showing accelerated levels of deterioration. See, "Unexploded bombs from the second world war are getting more dangerous," *New Scientist*, 27 March 2024, bit.ly/NewScientist27March2024; "Masts to be cut from Thames Estuary wreck packed with explosives," *BBC News*, 4 June 2020, bit.ly/BBCNews4June2020; Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "Report On The Wreck Of The SS Richard Montgomery," November 2000, p. 20; and Jamie Doward and Chris Bradford, "Fears grow that WW2 wreck could explode on Kent coast," *The Guardian*, 17 August 2019, bit.ly/TheGuardian17Aug2019.

⁶⁶ Maritime and Coastguard Agency, "SS Richard Montgomery: background information," updated 16 July 2024, bit.ly/MaritimeCoastguardAgency16Jul2024.

⁶⁷ Liz Jackson, "Explosives-filled shipwreck has safety work delayed as objects found," *BBC*, 13 April 2024, bbc.in/3zZuUDo.

⁶⁸ Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 7–10.

⁶⁹ Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2013 to 2021), Form F, pp. 14–15.

⁷⁰ Email from Elysee Kibiribiri, Advocacy and Victim Assistance Manager, Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL), 27 September 2023.

⁷¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Christophe Wembelumbe Lomami, Head of Quality Management Department, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 14 June 2024.

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CONTAMINATION IN NON-SIGNATORIES AND OTHER AREAS

Fourteen non-signatories and two other areas are, or are believed to be, contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Vietnam is massively contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but there is no accurate estimate of the extent of contamination. Despite ongoing land release activities, the Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC) reported in 2024 that more than 5.6 million hectares (56,000km²) are contaminated by ERW, including cluster munition remnants. This represents nearly 18% of Vietnam's total land area. The contamination is mostly found in the central provinces of Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Ngai. Of these provinces, Quang Tri reported a 13% reduction in areas contaminated by ERW, including cluster munition remnants, at the end of 2023.⁷²

Cambodia reduced the amount of contaminated area through land release in 2023 after reporting an increase in cluster munition contamination in 2022 following survey.⁷³ In February 2024, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) reported a total contamination of 731km².⁷⁴ This is a decrease from the reported contamination of 741.07km² as of the end of 2022.⁷⁵ Most of the contaminated areas are in the northeast, along the borders with Lao PDR and Vietnam.

In **Armenia**, land contaminated by ERW was assessed to total 42.17km² as of December 2023.⁷⁶ This is an increase of approximately 7% from the 2022 total of 39.24km².⁷⁷ In 2022, less than 3% of the contamination was estimated to be due to cluster munition remnants.⁷⁸ No update on the extent of cluster munition contamination has been made since then.

Azerbaijan's extent of cluster munition contamination in areas under its jurisdiction is not known due to ERW contamination in areas regained during the conflict with Armenia in 2020 that are yet to be surveyed. Casualties from cluster munition remnants continued to be reported in Azerbaijan in 2023.⁷⁹ In former other area Nagorno-Karabakh, a survey by The HALO Trust in the aftermath of the 2020 conflict found that 68% of inhabited settlements had experienced cluster munition use and contamination. The current extent of contamination in this region is not known but believed to total less than 16km².⁸⁰

In **Syria**, cluster munitions were used extensively between 2012 and 2020, across 13 of its 14 governorates, before use appeared to decline significantly in 2021. The HALO Trust conducted an initial assessment of ERW contamination in northwest Syria in 2018–2020 that showed cluster munition remnants were the most frequently found type of ordnance,

72 Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC), "National Digital Library on Explosive Ordnance Risk Education," undated, bit.ly/VNMACDigitalLibrary; and "Explosives remain in 5.6 million hectares in Việt Nam," *Viet Nam News*, 29 February 2024, bit.ly/VietNamNews29Feb2024.

73 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 25 May 2023; and CMAA, "Private Sector's Engagement in Mine Action," 13–15 February 2024, bit.ly/CMAA15Feb2024.

74 CMAA, "Private Sector's Engagement in Mine Action," 13–15 February 2024, bit.ly/CMAA15Feb2024.

75 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 25 May 2023.

76 Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), "National Mine Action Authority the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise sums up the activities carried out in 2023," 29 December 2023, bit.ly/ArmeniaCHDE2023.

77 CHDE, "Humanitarian Demining and Expert Center summarizes the work done in 2022," 30 December 2022, bit.ly/ArmeniaCHDE2022.

78 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Update of work of UN in Mine Action in Armenia," 20 October 2022, bit.ly/ArmeniaUNDP2022.

79 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Head of International Relations, Risk Education and Media Department, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 25 June 2024.

80 Liz Cookman, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Land still laced with mines, year after war," *Al Jazeera*, 9 November 2021, bit.ly/AlJazeera9Nov2021; and "The HALO Trust clears Stepanakert of unexploded hazards left by 2020 war," *Armenian Weekly*, 19 May 2022, bit.ly/ArmenianWeekly19May2022.

and also accounted for the highest number of casualties.⁸¹ New cluster munition use was reported in 2022 on camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in northwest Idlib governorate and in the same region in October 2023.⁸² Cluster munition contamination in Syria is believed to be significant but its exact extent remains undetermined.⁸³



A survey team conducts non-technical survey in Mykolaiv oblast, Ukraine. The site was surveyed with a drone prior to marking.

© Rasmus Emil Gravesen/DCA, January 2024

In **Ukraine**, extensive cluster munition attacks were reported in 2023 and the first half of 2024 after the Russian invasion, resulting in widespread contamination.⁸⁴ Cluster munitions continue to be used by both parties to the conflict. The extent of contaminated areas is difficult to ascertain but appears to be increasing due to the ongoing use of cluster munitions.

Yemen identified approximately 18km² of suspected cluster munition contaminated areas in 2014, before a Saudi Arabia-led coalition used cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015–2017. This reportedly increased cluster munition contamination in northwestern and central areas.⁸⁵ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported in 2021 that cluster munition and ERW contamination is widespread in the north.⁸⁶ In southern Yemen, with the exception of a few areas where the frontlines have shifted,

there is no cluster munition remnant contamination.⁸⁷ In 2022, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) did not report any cluster munition contamination and, as of 1 August 2024, had not provided any updates.⁸⁸

In **Kuwait**, cluster munition remnants continue to be periodically detected or unearthed. A survey of oilfields, which was completed between 2017 and 2021, reportedly found a large number of “unexploded ordnance, particularly cluster munitions.”⁸⁹ Torrential rains in 2022 exposed cluster munition remnants in the desert area of Kabad in Al Jahra. In 2023, the Kuwait Interior Ministry was reported to have destroyed “a large number of projectiles and cluster bombs” in the Salmiya Beach area.⁹⁰

In other area **Kosovo**, the Kosovo Mine Action Centre reported 9.24km² of cluster munition remnant contamination as of the end of 2023.⁹¹

Non-signatories Georgia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, Sudan, and Tajikistan, and other area Western Sahara are known or believed to each have less than 10km² of cluster munition remnant contamination.

81 The HALO Trust, “A Hidden Emergency: Why Explosive Ordnance Contamination must be addressed now in Northwest Syria,” December 2020, pp. 7 and 9, bit.ly/SyriaHALOTrustDec2020.

82 HRW, “Syria: Cluster Munitions Used in November 6 Attacks,” 23 November 2022, bit.ly/HRWSyria23Nov2022; and HRW, “Northwest Syria: Government Uses Cluster Munitions,” 5 November 2023, bit.ly/HRWSyria5Nov2023.

83 Information Management and Mine Action Program (iMMAP), “Northeast Syria: Humanitarian Mine Action Response: Bi-annual Update (October 2022–March 2023),” 20 June 2023, bit.ly/iMMAPSyriaJune2023; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Cassiopee Bruschini-Chaumet, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 25 April 2023; and by Francesca Chiaudani, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 8 May 2023.

84 HRW, “Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions,” 6 July 2023, bit.ly/UkraineHRW6July2023.

85 UNDP, “Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016; and UNDP, “Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2021,” February 2022, p. 7.

86 UNDP, “Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2020,” February 2021, p. 8.

87 Email from Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action, UNDP, 11 August 2020.

88 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, YEMAC, 22 May 2023.

89 Sebastian Castelier and Aladdin Elbarbary, “Killer mines in Kuwait keep Gulf War alive and deadly,” *Al Jazeera*, 28 November 2023, bit.ly/KuwaitAlJazeera28Nov2023.

90 Ramadan Al Sherbini, “Invasion-era bombs found on Kuwaiti beach,” *Gulf News*, 24 November 2023, bit.ly/KuwaitGulfNews24Nov2023.

91 Republic of Kosovo, “Kosovo Mine Action Strategy, 2025–2030,” p. 3, undated, bit.ly/KMACStrategy2025-2030.

Georgia is thought to be free of contamination, though South Ossetia—a disputed territory not controlled by the government of Georgia—is a possible exception.

Iran's extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is not known. Some contamination is believed to date from the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq war, when cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah.⁹²

Libya's contamination from cluster munition remnants is primarily the result of armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, particularly in urban areas. In 2019, there were several instances or allegations of cluster munition use by forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA).⁹³ The exact extent of contamination in Libya has not yet been determined.

Serbia is contaminated by cluster munition remnants in three municipalities: Bujanovac, Tutin, and Užice. Serbia reported 0.61km² of CHA as of 31 December 2023.⁹⁴

Sudan reported 142,402m² of cluster munition remnant contamination as of the end of 2021, with 5,820m² classified as CHA and 136,582m² as SHA.⁹⁵ Since conflict erupted in April 2023, Sudan has not been able to provide updated information on the extent of contamination.

Tajikistan has reported cluster munition remnant contamination totaling 3.74km² CHA.⁹⁶

Other area **Western Sahara** was reported to have 2.08km² of cluster munition remnant contamination as of the end of 2023.⁹⁷ This figure only defines cluster munition contamination east of the Berm and represents a slight increase from the figure reported for 2022, due to a newly identified CHA.⁹⁸

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CLEARANCE

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

CLEARANCE IN STATES PARTIES IN 2023

The following Monitor data on the clearance of cluster munition remnants in States Parties draws from information provided in reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 transparency reports, and Article 4 extension requests.⁹⁹

⁹² Interview with Ali Alizadeh, Iranian Air Force Colonel (ret.), Tehran, 8 February 2014.

⁹³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011),” S/2019/914, Annex 17, 9 December 2019, bit.ly/UNSCLibya9Dec2019; HRW, “Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli,” 20 February 2020, bit.ly/HRWLibya13Feb2020; and Sami Zaptia, “Tripoli forces claim successes and accuse Hafter of using cluster bombs and internationally banned phosphorus bombs,” *Libya Herald*, 20 June 2019, bit.ly/LibyaHerald20June2019.

⁹⁴ Serbian Mine Action Center (SMAC), “Mine Situation July 2024,” July 2024, bit.ly/SMACJuly2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor, SMAC, 8 April 2024.

⁹⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (SNMAC), 20 April 2022.

⁹⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Daler Eshonjonov, Operations Manager, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 3 April 2024.

⁹⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 22 April 2024.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ When varying annual figures are reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes, and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website. See, www.the-monitor.org.

Cluster munition remnant clearance by States Parties in 2022–2023¹⁰⁰

State Party	2022		2023	
	Clearance (km ²)	Cluster munition remnants destroyed	Clearance (km ²)	Cluster munition remnants destroyed
Afghanistan	1.98	2,880	1.03	740
BiH	0.64	1,599	0.26	434
Chad	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	0	1.44	229
Germany	1.34	1,187	0.87	483
Iraq	33.62	4,670	13.26	8,011
Lao PDR	54.37	64,516	62.09	58,735
Lebanon	1.15	2,556	0.66	1,956
Mauritania	0.39	N/R	0	0
Somalia	0	0	N/R	N/R
South Sudan*	N/A	N/A	4.30	2,760
TOTAL	93.49	77,408	83.91	73,348

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.

*South Sudan acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in August 2023. The convention entered into force for South Sudan on 1 February 2024. The time-bound obligation to clear cluster munition remnants on territory under its jurisdiction and control, as specified under Article 4 of the convention, begins from the date of entry into force.


¹⁰⁰ The following references are for calendar year 2023. Afghanistan data: only five cluster munition remnants were found during clearance of cluster munition contaminated sites. The remaining 734 were found during battle area clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) spot tasks. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Habib Rahimi, Operations Manager, DMA, 27 April 2024. BiH data: BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 15. Chad data: Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3. Chile data: Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 4–6; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024. Germany data: Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 16–20. Iraq data: Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 29–30; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 20 May 2024; Lao PDR data: Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 9–13; Lebanon data: response to Monitor by Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 April 2024. Mauritania data: response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 20 May 2024. South Sudan data: response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024.

The following references are for calendar year 2022. Afghanistan data: figures provided in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* (1.59m² cleared and 1,197 cluster munition remnants destroyed) were based on the response to the Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS Afghanistan, 3 April 2023. The figures have been updated for *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* based on the response to the Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Habib Rahimi, Operations Manager, DMA, 27 April 2024. BiH data: BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; and Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMIC), “Report on Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2022,” undated, p. 15. Chad data: Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; Chile data: Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. Germany data: Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. Iraq data: Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. Lao PDR data: Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F; National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA), “NRA Dashboard,” undated, bit.ly/NRALaoPDRDashboard. Lebanon data: Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F. Mauritania data: figures provided in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2023* (0.57km² cleared) were combined clearance figures for 2021 and 2022. The figure has been updated based on the response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

In 2023, nine States Parties released a combined total of 92.04km² of cluster munition contaminated land, of which 83.91km² was cleared and in which 73,348 cluster munition remnants—primarily unexploded submunitions—were destroyed.

The clearance total for 2023 represents a decrease from the 93.49km² reported cleared in 2022. Only Lao PDR reported clearing more land in 2023 than in 2022. Chile started clearing its cluster munition contaminated areas in 2023.¹⁰¹

Cluster munition remnant land release in 2023



Of the cluster munition contaminated land released by States Parties in 2023, 91.2% was cleared, 8.7% was reduced through technical survey, and only 0.1% was cancelled via non-technical survey. In total, States Parties released more than 17.09km² less land than in 2023.

Only BiH, Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan reported on land release methodologies other than clearance, with Iraq accounting for 96% of the total land released through technical survey and Lebanon accounting for 89% of the land released through non-technical survey.

Afghanistan reported that 1.03km² of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants was cleared and 740 cluster munition remnants were destroyed during 2023.¹⁰² No land was released through reduction or cancellation in 2023.¹⁰³

BiH reported that 0.49km² of cluster munition contaminated land was released in 2023 and 434 cluster munition remnants were destroyed. Of the land released, 0.26km² was cleared.¹⁰⁴



BiH announces completion of its clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions during a reception at the BiH Parliament in Sarajevo.

©NPA, September 2023

¹⁰¹ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, 25 April 2024, p. 6; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024.

¹⁰² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

¹⁰³ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 31–32.

¹⁰⁴ The figures in BiH's Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2023 suggest that 56,845m² remain contaminated based on the reported figures for contamination (548,504m²) and subsequent land release (491,659m²). See, BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 13–15. However, BiH declared completion of its clearance obligations in August 2023. See, BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 14; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country profiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina," 25 June 2024, bit.ly/CCMBiHProfile.

Chad did not report any survey or clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in 2023.¹⁰⁵

Chile reported clearance of 1.44km² of contaminated land and destruction of 229 cluster munition remnants in 2023.¹⁰⁶ This is the first clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas since survey activities concluded in 2021.¹⁰⁷

Germany cleared 0.87km² of contaminated land during 2023 and destroyed 483 cluster munition remnants. Between 2017 and 2023, it cleared a total of 6.59km².¹⁰⁸

Iraq reported clearing 13.26km² of cluster munition contaminated land in 2023, while another 7.69km² was released through survey. A total of 8,011 submunitions were destroyed in 2023, a significant increase from 4,670 in 2022. All the land release activities were conducted in the southern provinces of Iraq.¹⁰⁹



A Mines Advisory Group (MAG) demining team prepares for the destruction of cleared cluster munitions in Xieng Khouang province, Lao PDR.

© Anna Phommachanthone/Legacies of War, August 2023

As in previous years, **Lao PDR** cleared the most land of any affected country, accounting for 74% of all reported clearance. Lao PDR cleared 56.07km² of agricultural land and 6.02km² of land needed for development.¹¹⁰ In total, 58,735 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in Lao PDR during 2023. More than 97% (60.3km²) of the total land cleared in 2023 occurred in the nine most heavily contaminated provinces.¹¹¹

Lebanon reported releasing 0.85km² of cluster munition contaminated land during 2023, of which 0.66km² was cleared, 0.13km² was cancelled through non-technical survey, and 0.06km² was reduced through technical survey.¹¹² The 0.66km² cleared in 2023 represents a decrease from the 1.15km² cleared in 2022. A total of 1,956 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in 2023. From 2017–2023, Lebanon

cleared a total of 8.1km² of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Mauritania reported that no areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants were released during 2023.¹¹³

Somalia did not provide a report or an update on any clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2023, and did not report any progress for 2019–2022.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁵ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3.

¹⁰⁶ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 6; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of the International Cooperation Department, 6 May 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, pp. 3 and 5, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

¹⁰⁸ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 19.

¹⁰⁹ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 28–29; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 20 May 2024.

¹¹⁰ Development land is predominantly cleared by commercial operators and does not exclusively consist of areas known to be contaminated with cluster munitions. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 12.

¹¹¹ The nine provinces are Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Salavan, Savannakhet, Xaisomboun, Xekong, and Xieng Khouang. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 9–12.

¹¹² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 April 2024.

¹¹³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 20 May 2024; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 16.

¹¹⁴ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2019–2022), Form F.

South Sudan reported releasing 4.32km² of cluster munition contaminated land in 2023, of which 4.3km² was cleared and 0.02km² was cancelled through non-technical survey. In 2023, 2,760 cluster munition remnants were destroyed during land release operations.¹¹⁵

ARTICLE 4 CLEARANCE DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants on its territory within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention for that country, it can request an extension to its clearance deadline under Article 4 for a period of up to five years.

Despite making progress in surveying and clearing areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, Germany and Lao PDR submitted the first clearance deadline extension requests in 2019. Both states received five-year extensions. More requests have been submitted by other States Parties every year since 2019.

In 2020–2021, requests to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines were granted to Afghanistan, BiH, Chile, Lebanon, and Mauritania. In 2022, Chile submitted a third extension request based on the completion of technical survey. Requests were also submitted in 2022 by BiH and Chad. In 2023, Iraq submitted its first extension request, and Mauritania submitted its second.

In 2024, Chad, Germany, and Lao PDR all submitted their second extension requests which will be considered during the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in September 2024.¹¹⁶

The Lausanne Action Plan notes that sustained efforts are required to ensure that States Parties complete their clearance obligations as soon as possible, and within their original Article 4 deadlines. Only Somalia remains within its original deadline, however, its progress towards the original deadline is unclear. South Sudan is also working towards its original deadline after the convention entered into force for South Sudan on 1 February 2024.

Chad reported in June 2021 that it would complete clearance by its September 2023 deadline.¹¹⁷ However, in September 2022 it received an extension until 1 October 2024 to conduct non-technical survey on 19.05km² of land suspected to be contaminated with cluster munition remnants in Tibesti province.¹¹⁸ In January 2024, Chad presented a second extension request for two years with the same purpose and reported that insufficient financial resources, unfavorable weather conditions, poor road conditions, and a lack of data necessitated the additional extension request.¹¹⁹

In 2019, Germany stated that it needed a five-year extension until 1 August 2025 due to slow clearance progress resulting from the high density of contamination and restrictions in accessing the contaminated area, which is part of a nature reserve within a military site.¹²⁰ In May 2024, Germany submitted an extension request for another five years through

¹¹⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024.

¹¹⁶ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Extension requests to be considered at the 12th Meeting of States Parties (12MSP),” undated, www.clusterconvention.org/12msp-er.

¹¹⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021; and email from Olivier Shu, Senior Technical Advisor, Swiss Foundation for Demining (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD), 19 June 2021.

¹¹⁸ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” 19 September 2022, p. 4, bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport.

¹¹⁹ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, p. 12, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024.

¹²⁰ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 15 January 2019, bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2019; and statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Review Conference, held virtually, 26 November 2020, bit.ly/GermanyStatement26Nov2020.

1 August 2030.¹²¹ It reported that it could not complete clearance by 2025 due to a limited number of available EOD personnel; the number of personnel that could be safely deployed given the decreasing size of the contaminated area; poor weather conditions; conservation regulations that restrict ground preparation and clearance work; and the high density of contamination in the areas to be cleared.¹²²

Lao PDR indicated that completion of survey has been the priority during its first five-year extension period (through 1 August 2025) and said additional time and international support will be needed.¹²³ By the end of 2023, it had completed systematic survey in five provinces; however, survey was still ongoing in one province, and underway less systematically and at a reduced rate in other provinces.¹²⁴ In June 2024, Lao PDR submitted a second extension request, for another five years through 1 August 2030. Its plan is to conduct non-technical survey in 750 villages, and cluster munition remnants survey (CMRS) of 100km², as well as to clear 325km² of cluster munition contaminated land.¹²⁵

Status of Article 4 progress to completion (as of 1 August 2024)

State Party	Current deadline	Extension period (number of request)	Original deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2026	4 years (1 st)	1 March 2022	Behind target
Chad	1 October 2024	13 months (1 st)	1 September 2023	Requested 2-year extension until 1 October 2026
Chile	1 June 2026	1 year (1 st) 1 year (2 nd) 3 years (3 rd)	1 June 2021	Behind target
Germany	1 August 2025	5 years (1 st)	1 August 2020	Requested 5-year extension until 1 August 2030
Iraq	1 November 2028	5 years (1 st)	1 November 2023	On target
Lao PDR	1 August 2025	5 years (1 st)	1 August 2020	Requested 5-year extension until 1 August 2030
Lebanon	1 May 2026	5 years (1 st)	1 May 2021	Behind target
Mauritania	1 August 2026	2 years (1 st) 2 years (2 nd)	1 August 2022	Behind target
Somalia	1 March 2026	N/A	1 March 2026	Unclear
South Sudan	1 February 2034	N/A	1 February 2034	On target

Note: N/A=not applicable.

¹²¹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Extension requests to be considered at the 12th Meeting of States Parties (12MSP)," undated, www.clusterconvention.org/12msp-er.

¹²² Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 21; and Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, p. 48, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024.

¹²³ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, executive summary, 26 February 2019, bit.ly/LaosExecutiveSummary2019.

¹²⁴ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 14.

¹²⁵ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), Part B Detailed Narrative, 10 June 2024 and Annex I Detailed Workplan, 17 May 2024, www.clusterconvention.org/12msp-er.

Afghanistan initially reported that it would meet its original clearance deadline of 1 March 2022, as there was a commitment from UNMAS and the US to financially support clearance operations for 10 areas.¹²⁶ However, the discovery of additional contamination and a change in donor priorities led Afghanistan to submit an extension request until March 2026, granted in 2021.¹²⁷ In May 2024, Afghanistan reported that completing clearance is dependent on funding, which has become less certain.¹²⁸ Afghanistan released 1.03km² of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2023 but has over 9km² left to be addressed, which means it seems likely that Afghanistan will submit another extension request.¹²⁹

During its first decade as State Party, Chile made little progress clearing contaminated areas. In January 2020, it sought an extension period of five years until 2026.¹³⁰ It revised the request to a one-year interim extension in June 2020 to enable technical survey before submitting an extension request with a clearance plan.¹³¹ In June 2021, Chile submitted a second one-year extension request and reported that the survey had not taken place due to a lack of resources and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹³² The technical survey was completed in 2021, and Chile submitted a third extension request in April 2022, for a period of three years, to clear 30.77km² of CHA identified in the 2021 survey.¹³³ Following a preparatory phase, Chile commenced clearance in 2023. However, at the current clearance rate, Chile is unlikely to fulfill its Article 4 clearance obligations by 2026.¹³⁴

Iraq reported in February 2022 that it would not be able to meet its original clearance deadline of 1 November 2023.¹³⁵ Challenges included the discovery, through survey, of additional contaminated areas, particularly in the south.¹³⁶ In March 2023, Iraq submitted a five-year extension request until 1 November 2028, which was granted in September

¹²⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

¹²⁷ Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2021, bit.ly/AfghanistanCCMArt4ExtRequest2021; and email from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 17 July 2021.

¹²⁸ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 34; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

¹²⁹ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 32–33; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager DMAC, 27 April 2024; and by Abdul Habib Rahimi, Operations Manager, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

¹³⁰ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, January 2020, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJan2020.

¹³¹ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 29 June 2020, pp. 5 and 7; bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJune2020.

¹³² Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

¹³³ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 May 2022, bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022.

¹³⁴ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, 25 April 2024, p. 6; response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024.

¹³⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 24 February 2022; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 32.

¹³⁶ Iraq stated that obtaining accurate information about the strike locations of US forces would help speed up the survey, planning, and clearance process. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 24 February 2022 and 5 March 2021; and Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 47.

2023.¹³⁷ Iraq is continuously releasing land, but it is too early to predict if it will complete clearance by 2028.¹³⁸

In 2021, Lebanon was granted an extension to complete clearance by 1 May 2026, but reported that a decrease in funding had reduced the number of teams working to clear cluster munition contaminated areas.¹³⁹ In April 2023, Lebanon reported that it might require one extra year.¹⁴⁰ In March 2024, LMAC said a second extension request might be needed in the face of implementation challenges, including the difficulty of mobilizing additional international assistance.¹⁴¹

In 2021, Mauritania received an Article 4 extension to complete survey and clearance by 1 August 2024.¹⁴² In March 2022, Mauritania reported that it still needed to determine the extent of contaminated areas to confirm if it could meet this deadline.¹⁴³ In September 2023, Mauritania received another two-year extension through 1 August 2026.¹⁴⁴ Due to the contamination that still needs to be cleared (including newly discovered hazardous areas in 2023), it is unlikely that Mauritania will be able to complete its clearance obligations by the 2026 deadline.¹⁴⁵

It is unclear if Somalia will meet its clearance deadline of 1 March 2026, as it has not yet conducted a comprehensive survey.¹⁴⁶ Somalia has no reported plan for clearance and did not report any clearance activities in 2020–2023. As of 1 August 2024, Somalia had not provided any updates on contamination.

Newly acceded State Party South Sudan is working towards its initial Article 4 clearance deadline of 1 February 2034 to clear the 10.19km² cluster munition contamination identified as of the end of December 2023.¹⁴⁷

CLEARANCE IN SIGNATORY STATES, NON-SIGNATORY STATES, AND OTHER AREAS IN 2023

In 2023, signatory DRC and non-signatories Cambodia, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, as well as other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, reported clearance of cluster munition contaminated land and/or the destruction of cluster munition remnants. More information can be found in annual country profiles on the Monitor website.

¹³⁷ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Extension requests to be considered at the 11th Meeting of States Parties (11MSP),” undated, bit.ly/CCMExtensionRequests11MSP; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties,” 29 September 2023, p. 3, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

¹³⁸ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 26; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 20 May 2024.

¹³⁹ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 18.

¹⁴⁰ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, p. 17; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023.

¹⁴¹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Lebanon Mine Action Centre Extension Request Consultation,” 15 May 2024, bit.ly/LebanonCCMConsultation15May2024.

¹⁴² Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

¹⁴³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization (MIDEC), 21 March 2022.

¹⁴⁴ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties,” 29 September 2023, p. 4, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

¹⁴⁵ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, pp. 13–14; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

¹⁴⁶ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 6–7.

¹⁴⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024.

RISK EDUCATION

OBLIGATIONS REGARDING RISK EDUCATION

Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states that each State Party shall “conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.” Risk education involves interventions aimed at protecting civilian populations and individuals, at the time of cluster munition use, when they fail to function as intended, and when they have been abandoned.

In most States Parties contaminated by cluster munitions, remnants are found in rural areas and directly impact people who rely on the land and natural resources for their livelihoods. Men are a particularly high-risk group due to their participation in activities – such as land cultivation, collection of firewood and other forest products, hunting and fishing, and herding animals – that take them into contaminated areas. At 66% of all risk education beneficiaries, children are considered the most vulnerable group, as they are curious and try to play with or manipulate explosive ordnance due to a lack of knowledge and understanding of the threat and potential consequences. Boys, in particular, are especially vulnerable because they often engage in activities in and near contaminated areas, whether for work or play.



In Syria’s Idlib governorate, members of a Syria Civil Defence clearance team put up posters to help Ariha residents identify cluster munition remnants and other explosive devices.

© White Helmets (Syria Civil Defence), May 2024

Compared with 2022, the percentage of children who received risk education increased by more than 14%.¹⁴⁸

Children represented the largest number of direct beneficiaries of risk education in 2023 in all States Parties except Lao PDR, where the most reached target group was men. Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan predominantly targeted boys, while in Chad, girls represented the largest group of beneficiaries.¹⁴⁹


In Afghanistan, communities living near contaminated areas were targeted for risk education, as were returnees and IDPs, nomads, scrap metal collectors, aid workers, and travelers.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ A comprehensive global 2023 dataset submitted by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was included in the Monitor analysis for States Parties for which it was clear that the information was not already included in other provided datasets. This increased the reported percentage of children who received risk education in 2023 by 19%. Email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024.

¹⁴⁹ In the case of Afghanistan and Chad, adults would have been the largest beneficiary group if the 2023 global dataset from UNICEF (which increased the percentage of children who received risk education in 2023 by 19%) had not been included. Dataset provided by email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024.

¹⁵⁰ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, p. 34; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mariyampillai Mariyaselvam, Chief Child Protection, UNICEF Afghanistan, 7 July 2024; and by Mohammad Daud Rafi, Planning and Information Officer, The HALO Trust, 21 May 2024.

Risk education beneficiaries in cluster munition affected States Parties by age and sex¹⁵¹



In BiH, accidents are more common in spring and autumn, when people engage more heavily in agricultural work, and also go to the forest to collect firewood. Target groups for risk education in BiH included farmers, mountaineers, hunters, people collecting wood and other natural resources, as well as migrants traveling through BiH territory.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ The data used for the Monitor analysis is drawn from risk education beneficiary figures collected by States Parties and international and national agencies and operators, where their data is not included in the official State Party's Article 7 reporting or response to the Monitor questionnaire. International operators collected data according to the Standard Beneficiary Definition guidelines. See, DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council, FSD, The HALO Trust, HI, MAG, and NPA, "Standardising Beneficiary Definitions in Humanitarian Mine Action: Second Edition," p. 9, October 2020, bit.ly/StandardisingBeneficiaryDef. Data in the chart reflects only "direct" beneficiaries of risk education, defined as those who receive safety messages through interpersonal risk education sessions, mass and digital media, and training of trainers programs. Beneficiary data for digital media was often not disaggregated and in these cases was not included in the overall Monitor figures. The Monitor analysis included the data of nine cluster munition contaminated States Parties: Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan. In the nine countries, a total of 1,454,028 men, 696,630 women, 2,378,609 boys, and 1,720,866 girls benefited from risk education activities. Afghanistan data: Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, pp. 35–37; email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024, and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mariyampillai Mariyaselvam, Chief Child Protection, UNICEF Afghanistan, 7 July 2024. BiH data: BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, pp. 18–20. Chad data: Chad Convention Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), p. 4; and email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024. Iraq data: in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 42 and 51, Iraq reported beneficiary figures for the whole of Iraq including for governorates with cluster munition contamination and the Kurdistan region. The figures reported in the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report concern "beneficiaries from cluster munition awareness activities" exclusively. For the Monitor analysis, only these figures have been included. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, pp. 36–37. Lao PDR data: NRA, "NRA Dashboard," undated, bit.ly/NRALaoPDRDashboard; Lebanon data: Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, pp. 20–23; and email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024. Mauritania data: response to Monitor questionnaire by Khadijetou Tolba, Chief of Risk Education, PNDHD, 20 May 2024. Somalia data: UNMAS, "Annual Report 2023," 26 April 2024, p. 83, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023; email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Julia Skinner, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 22 May 2024; South Sudan data: email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024; response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024; and UNMAS, "Annual Report 2023," 26 April 2024, p. 83, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023. UNMAS also provided risk education to 30,000 IDPs but did not provide disaggregated figures.

¹⁵² BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, May 2022, p. 8, bit.ly/BihArt4ExtRequestMay2022.

In Chad, nomadic communities have been identified as high risk due to their transit through desert areas that may be contaminated.¹⁵³ Sudanese refugees in Chad were also targeted for risk education in 2023.¹⁵⁴

In Iraq, risk education continued with a focus on Bedouin people in the southern governorate of Al-Muthanna and residents of the western Badiya region to address the higher risk of incidents related to seasonal livelihood activities.¹⁵⁵

In Lao PDR, risk education was aimed at men and boys in particular as they are the most at-risk groups due to their participation in livelihood activities such as cultivation, the collection of forest products, and hunting and fishing. One focus of risk education in Lao PDR included the delivery of messages and material in multiple languages to reach ethnic minorities.¹⁵⁶ In Lao PDR, risk education is also integrated into the school curricula.¹⁵⁷

In Lebanon, Syrian refugees remained a priority group for risk education during 2023, as several refugee camps and settlements are located close to contaminated areas, and refugees are reportedly less familiar with this contamination. Economic hardship in recent years has also encouraged greater risk-taking, including the collection of scrap metal as people try to supplement diminishing livelihoods.¹⁵⁸

Mauritania reported focusing its risk education activities on farmers, shepherds, nomads, IDPs, migrants, and scrap metal collectors.¹⁵⁹

In Somalia, while the delivery of risk education to herders, nomadic communities, and children continued from 2022, a particular focus was reported to have been on IDPs.¹⁶⁰

In South Sudan, risk education targeted children, foresters, farmers, herders, and scrap metal collectors in general. However, priority was also given to IDPs, returnees, and refugees.¹⁶¹



A Danish Refugee Council staff member conducts an explosive ordnance risk education session in Mokha district, Yemen.

© Faten Bamusa/Danish Refugee Council, January 2024

¹⁵³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Francesca Batault, Program Officer for the Lake Chad Basin, MAG, 13 July 2023; statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 8, bit.ly/ChadStatement21June2023; and International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Rising Needs at Chad-Sudan Border Amid Funding Gaps," 27 April 2023, bit.ly/IOMChad27April2023.

¹⁵⁴ Statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 8, bit.ly/ChadStatement21June2023; and IOM, "Rising Needs at Chad-Sudan Border Amid Funding Gaps," 27 April 2023, bit.ly/IOMChad27April2023.

¹⁵⁵ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, pp. 35–36; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 20 May 2024; by Jad Ibrahim, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 2 June 2024; and by Elimam Hassan Mohamed, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG, 5 June 2024.

¹⁵⁶ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, p. 17; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Katherine O'Brien, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 6 June 2024.

¹⁵⁷ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form A, p. 4.

¹⁵⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, Risk Education Section Head, LMAG, 8 April 2024; by Ali Shuib, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 21 May 2024; Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, p. 19; and UNOCHA, "Increasing Humanitarian Needs in Lebanon," 14 April 2022, p. 7, bit.ly/UNOCHALebanon14April2022.

¹⁵⁹ Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 17; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Khadijetou Tolba, Head of Risk Education, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

¹⁶⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julia Skinner, Program Officer, The HALO Trust, 22 May 2024.

¹⁶¹ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024; by Ida Hoejgaard, Programme Manager for Humanitarian Response, Resilience and Mine Action, DCA, 4 July 2024; and by James Julius Wani, Community Liaison/Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Manager, Danish Refugee Council, 4 July 2024.

Risk education delivery methods in States Parties included: emergency responses following incidents; face-to-face standalone sessions; and risk education activities integrated into mine action (such as survey and clearance) and into other activities such as health or environmental initiatives. Training of trainers was aimed at teachers, community focal points, civil society groups or personnel of civil society groups, security forces, and governmental as well as non-governmental institutions. Risk education providers used traditional means, including print material, presentations, as well as different entertainment methods, such as games, sports activities, theatrical performances, or puppet shows, to disseminate risk education messages. In addition, conveying risk education through different digital means and mass media has become more prevalent every year, including in 2023. This includes the diffusion of risk education messages via social media channels, TV, radio, the internet, and mobile phones.

RISK EDUCATION IN SIGNATORY AND NON-SIGNATORY STATES

Risk education was conducted in 2023 in signatory states Angola and the DRC; in non-signatory states Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Libya, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Yemen; and in other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara. More information can be found in annual country profiles on the Monitor website.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

OBLIGATIONS REGARDING VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that States Parties assist all cluster munition victims in areas under their jurisdiction, and report on progress.

Specific activities to ensure adequate assistance provided under Article 5 include:

- Collecting data and assessing the needs of cluster munition victims;
- Coordinating victim assistance programs and developing a national plan;
- Actively involving cluster munition victims in all processes that affect them;
- Providing adequate and accessible assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support, and socio-economic inclusion;
- Providing assistance that is gender- and age-sensitive, and non-discriminatory.¹⁶²

These activities must be implemented in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.

Fourteen States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have reported having responsibility for assisting cluster munition victims.

States Parties that have reported responsibility for cluster munition victims

Afghanistan	Lao PDR
Albania	Lebanon
BiH	Mauritania
Chad	Montenegro
Croatia	Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau	Somalia
Iraq	South Sudan

¹⁶² This obligation is understood to include measures promoting equality and non-discrimination and enjoyment of rights on an equal basis to others including disability sensitivity, diversity, and intersectionality.

The Lausanne Action Plan's commitments on victim assistance largely reflect the obligations enshrined in the convention.

Action 34 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to provide first-aid and long-term medical care to cluster munition victims, as well as to ensure victims can access adequate rehabilitation, psychological, and psychosocial support services as part of a broader public health approach. States Parties should have a national referral mechanism and a directory of services. Victim assistance should be provided in a non-discriminatory manner, and be sensitive to gender, age, and disability.

Action 35 requires States Parties to facilitate the educational and socio-economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such measures may take the form of employment referrals, access to micro-finance, livelihood support, and rural development and social protection programs.

Action 37 commits States Parties to endeavor to support the training, development, and official recognition of multidisciplinary, skilled, and qualified rehabilitation professionals.

Medical care

In 2023, medical responses for cluster munition victims included first-aid, field trauma response, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care, as well as addressing longer-term healthcare needs. However, in many States Parties, medical care was not available or was seriously inadequate in communities near areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

In Afghanistan, a substantial decrease in international financial and technical support for the healthcare infrastructure following the Taliban's takeover in August 2021 has critically undermined the public health system. This has disproportionately impacted women and girls due to restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement and employment. Access to health services has been severely impeded, and the training of female healthcare professionals has been almost entirely obstructed.¹⁶³ The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported 33 hospitals through its Hospital Resilience Program, an emergency interim measure aimed at circumventing the collapse of the Afghanistan's healthcare system following the transfer of authority to the Taliban government (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) in August 2021. In April 2023, the new government assumed responsibility for eight of the 33 ICRC-supported hospitals.¹⁶⁴ A non-governmental organization working in Afghanistan, EMERGENCY, maintained a network of first-aid posts and primary healthcare centers, and ran an ambulance service for isolated areas.¹⁶⁵

In Lao PDR, the Ministry of Health, with support from partners World Education Laos and the survivor-led Quality of Life Association (QLA), provided medical treatment to cluster munition survivors. World Education Laos partnered with the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA) to administer the War Victims Medical Fund. The fund provides emergency assistance to survivors and their families, including medical expenses, transport, and funeral expenses.¹⁶⁶

Lebanon suffered deterioration in the provision of healthcare amid the ongoing economic crisis in the country. Hospitals were forced to restrict essential health services and limit the

¹⁶³ HRW, "A Disaster for the Foreseeable Future: Afghanistan's Healthcare Crisis," 12 February 2024, [bit.ly/HRWafghanistanHealthcare12Feb2024](https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/02/12/afghanistan-healthcare-crisis).

¹⁶⁴ ICRC, "Afghanistan: Operational Facts and Figures – 2023," 20 February 2024, [bit.ly/ICRCafghanistan20Feb2023](https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/operational-facts-and-figures/afghanistan-2023); and ICRC, "The ICRC continues to assist the massive humanitarian needs in Afghanistan," 28 August 2023, [bit.ly/ICRCafghanistan28Aug2023](https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-statement/afghanistan-2023-08-28).

¹⁶⁵ EMERGENCY, "Activity Report 1994–2023," undated, [bit.ly/EMERGENCY1994-2023Report](https://www.emergency.org/afghanistan/activity-report-1994-2023).

¹⁶⁶ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; and email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, WEL, 4 March 2022.

distribution of medicine as the healthcare system deteriorated.¹⁶⁷ Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) reported that, in Lebanon in 2023, Syrian refugees were finding it increasingly difficult to access essential medical care services due to an “atmosphere of intimidation.”¹⁶⁸ In July 2024, MSF added that due to mounting crackdowns, including raids, increased restrictions on freedom of movement, and the threat of forced deportation, Syrian refugees fear leaving their shelters to access medicine and seek medical help.¹⁶⁹ The ICRC provided first-aid training and supported public hospitals.¹⁷⁰

The availability of emergency healthcare increased in Iraq in 2023. Front-line medical and health workers received basic emergency care training through the World Health Organization (WHO) Iraq, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health.¹⁷¹ Iraq also reported that a guide to facilitate access to emergency medical services, including in rural and remote areas, was prepared. People injured by cluster munition remnants were evacuated by others or received first-aid from organizations working nearby.¹⁷²

In South Sudan, state hospitals and health facilities under the National Ministry of Health continued to be inadequately equipped and understaffed, making them incapable of effectively delivering emergency health responses. Vast distances, prevalent insecurity, and constrained resources resulted in healthcare centers becoming non-functional without external support. The health system’s reliance on donor funding through international non-governmental partners also led to significant gaps. The influx of Sudanese refugees since the 2023 conflict placed further strains on the already scarce existing capacities.¹⁷³

Physical rehabilitation

In 2023, rehabilitation services included physiotherapy and the provision of assistive devices such as prosthetics, orthotics, mobility aids, and wheelchairs. However, States Parties continued to face significant challenges in providing adequate, accessible, and affordable rehabilitation.

In Afghanistan, the ICRC supported rehabilitation centers in seven provinces. It also provided materials, training, and technical assistance to eight orthopedic workshops and built a new rehabilitation center in Lashkar Gah.¹⁷⁴ Humanity & Inclusion (Handicap International, HI) deployed an emergency mobile team in 2023 to deliver urgent physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support to persons with disabilities in rural areas of Kabul, Kandahar, and Nimroz provinces. HI also referred people to healthcare services.¹⁷⁵ The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) provided thousands of people with physiotherapy and orthopedic aids.

¹⁶⁷ Hasan Ismail, “The changing face of healthcare in Lebanon: navigating an economic crisis,” *Peoples Dispatch*, 6 April 2023, bit.ly/PeoplesDispatch6April2023; and Elie Bou Sanayeh and Carolla El Chamieh, “The fragile healthcare system in Lebanon: sounding the alarm about its possible collapse,” *Health Economics Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, April 2023, bit.ly/LebanonHealthcareApril2023.

¹⁶⁸ Doctors without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF), “Syrians in Lebanon avoid healthcare in fear of deportations,” 17 May 2023, bit.ly/MSFLebanon17May2023; and MSF, “Fear of deportation keeps Syrian refugees from seeking care in Lebanon,” 19 May 2023, bit.ly/MSFSyrianRefugees19May2023.

¹⁶⁹ MSF, “Trapped in fear: Syrian refugees face unbearable choices in Lebanon,” 2 July 2024, bit.ly/MSFSyrianRefugees2July2024.

¹⁷⁰ ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume II,” June 2024, p. 421, bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport.

¹⁷¹ World Health Organization (WHO), “Emergency health care boosted across Iraq in 2023,” 22 January 2024, bit.ly/WHOIraqHealthcare22Jan2024.

¹⁷² Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), p. 67; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 12 April 2021.

¹⁷³ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁷⁴ The ICRC supported rehabilitation centers in Faizabad, Gulbar, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Lashkar Gah, and Mazar-i-Sharif provinces. It provided assistance to orthopedic workshops in Assadabad, Ghazni, Kandahar, Maimana, Pulikumri, and Taloqan. ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme in Afghanistan,” 9 May 2022, bit.ly/ICRCAfghanistanPRP9May2022; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume II,” June 2024, p. 258, bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport.

¹⁷⁵ ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2023,” 18 March 2024, p. 71, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023.

In March 2024, SCA was forced to suspend its activities following a decree from the ruling government, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, banning aid from Sweden.¹⁷⁶

Albania has rehabilitation services available at national and regional levels of the health sector. However, it did not provide a much-needed update on the situation of the Prosthetics Department within the Kukes Regional Hospital specifically. The hospital, which is located in a cluster munition contaminated area, was previously reported to have deteriorated due to a lack of funding, prosthetics materials, and staff capacity.¹⁷⁷

In Chad, HI continued to partner with local rehabilitation centers to support referrals and services.¹⁷⁸

In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action, through the Ministry of Health, distributed mobility aids and assistive devices.¹⁷⁹

In Lao PDR, the Center for Medical Rehabilitation, operated jointly by the Ministry of Health and the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), provided physical rehabilitation to 135 survivors of cluster munitions and ERW in 2023.¹⁸⁰ In July 2024, the Okard project, which provides victim assistance and promotes the functional ability of persons with disabilities, was extended into Phase II (2024–2027).¹⁸¹ The project is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

In Mauritania, the government provided victim assistance grants to the National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) and the National Orthopedic and Functional Rehabilitation Center (Centre National d'Orthopédie et de Réhabilitation Fonctionnelle, CNORF). The country has only one rehabilitation center, located in the capital, far from areas contaminated by cluster munitions.¹⁸²

Sierra Leone has a National Rehabilitation Centre with four satellite centers under the Ministry of Health, however, rehabilitation and prosthetics services are limited. There has been a lack of materials for the production of prosthetics and only one fully trained technician in the country.¹⁸³



An ortho-prosthetist technician works on a lower limb prosthesis at the physiotherapy and prosthetics center in Aden, Yemen.

© Till Mayer/HI, January 2024

¹⁷⁶ Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), “Suspension of SCA leaves thousands without orthopedic aids,” 9 April 2024, bit.ly/SCA9April2024.

¹⁷⁷ Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form H; and email from Izet Ademaj, Monitor Country Researcher, 9 June 2022.

¹⁷⁸ HI, “Country sheet: Chad 2022,” updated September 2023, bit.ly/HICountrySheetChad2023.

¹⁷⁹ Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 56.

¹⁸⁰ Statement of Lao PDR, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 13 September 2023; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁸¹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “United States and Laos Expand Commitment to Disability Inclusion,” 17 July 2024, bit.ly/LaoPDROkardPhase2.

¹⁸² Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H, p. 20; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Vadel Saleck, Head of Victims’ Unit, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

¹⁸³ SwissABILITY, “An orthopedic centre for war survivors in Sierra Leone,” 2 May 2024, bit.ly/SwissABILITYSierraLeone2May2024; and Koalaa launches pilot project in Sierra Leone, 31 August 2023, bit.ly/KoalaaSierraLeone31Aug2023.

In Somalia, provision of rehabilitation services remained challenging amid ongoing insecurity. Physical rehabilitation centers run by the Somali Red Crescent Society have been supported by the Norwegian Red Cross and the ICRC.¹⁸⁴

Psychological and psychosocial support

Psychological support included counselling, individual peer-to-peer support, community-based support groups, and survivor networks. However, peer-to-peer support should be better supported as a vital element of psychosocial support, being inclusive, targeted, cost-effective, and sustainable.

BiH reported that psychological and psychosocial support was made available to survivors.¹⁸⁵

Psychosocial assistance workshops were held for survivors of explosive weapons in Croatia, and support for war victims was available through specialized centers.¹⁸⁶

In Iraq, HI provided mental health and psychosocial support services in Anbar and Ninewa governorates.¹⁸⁷

In Lao PDR, psychosocial support was provided to survivors by World Education Laos. Physical rehabilitation included access to psychosocial rehabilitation.¹⁸⁸ However, overall, psychological support services remained limited.

In Lebanon, the mine action center facilitated psychological support sessions alongside ITF Enhancing Human Security. Psychological support beneficiaries increased in 2023.¹⁸⁹ The ICRC provided mental health support and referred survivors to social integration initiatives.¹⁹⁰

Socio-economic inclusion and education

Economic inclusion via vocational training, micro-credit and income-generation projects, and employment programs remained an area of great need for cluster munition victims in 2023. Access to inclusive education, and social inclusion through sport, leisure, and cultural activities were also ongoing needs.

In BiH in 2023, survivors received vocational training and economic support, most notably for developing beekeeping, through local and international organizations, including through ITF Enhancing Human Security.¹⁹¹

In Croatia, survivors received assistance through training, counselling, and employability workshops.¹⁹²

In Guinea Bissau, HI activities in the inclusive education sector concluded in 2023 due to a lack of funding.¹⁹³

In Iraq, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs continued to provide services regarding employment, study, and training.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁴ ICRC, "Somalia Facts & Figures: January–December 2023," bit.ly/ICRCSomalia2023.

¹⁸⁵ Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), "Preliminary Observation Bosnia and Herzegovina Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024, bit.ly/MBTObservationVABiHJun2024.

¹⁸⁶ Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁸⁷ HI, "Country card: Iraq 2023," updated September 2023, bit.ly/HICountryCardIraq2023.

¹⁸⁸ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁸⁹ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Pierre Faddoul, Victim Assistance Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023; and by Simon Abou Haidar, Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) Head of Section, LMAC, 8 April 2024.

¹⁹⁰ ICRC, "Annual Report 2023, Volume II," June 2024, p. 423, bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport.

¹⁹¹ BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form J.

¹⁹² Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁹³ HI, "Country sheet: Guinea Bissau 2022," updated September 2022, bit.ly/HICountrySheetGuineaBissau2022.

¹⁹⁴ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

Lao PDR placed greater focus on vocational training and socio-economic support for ERW survivors in its annual workplan and was able to support 183 people from over 1,000 considered.¹⁹⁵ Survivors received vocational training and economic support from the local survivor-led organization QLA.¹⁹⁶

In Montenegro, legislative amendments adopted in 2023 gave civilian casualties of the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign against Yugoslavia the right to monthly compensation as victims of conflict, but only for those casualties that occurred on the territory of Montenegro.¹⁹⁷

VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN SIGNATORY STATES, NON-SIGNATORY STATES, AND OTHER AREAS

Other than in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, victim assistance services were available to some degree in most states and areas with cluster munition casualties.

Non-signatories Ukraine and Yemen, as States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, both have commitments to assist victims, but did not specifically report on assistance to cluster munition victims despite the high numbers of recent recorded casualties. Cambodia and Vietnam, which have high numbers of historical cluster munition victims, did not specifically highlight how their programs reach cluster munition victims, but updated information on services available to all survivors of mines/ERW. In 2023, cluster munition victims from Serbia received modern prostheses and advanced rehabilitation at the University Rehabilitation Institute, Republic of Slovenia.

Ongoing conflict in cluster munition affected countries outside the convention, including Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, impeded the delivery of vital victim assistance while also contributing to the fragility of health systems.

MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

COORDINATION, STRATEGIES, AND PLANNING

CLEARANCE

Strong coordination is an important aspect of national ownership of mine action programs as it enables efficient and effective operations.

In 2023, clearance programs in eight States Parties with cluster munition contamination—Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia—had national coordination mechanisms in place. In Chile, the defense ministry is responsible for coordinating clearance as the contamination is on a former military site.¹⁹⁸ In Germany, the contaminated former military site is managed by the Federal Institute for Real Estate.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Statement of Lao PDR, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 13 September 2023; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁹⁶ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁹⁷ Human Rights Action, “The Assembly of Montenegro Should Treat All Civil Victims of War Equally,” 22 December 2023, bit.ly/HRA22Dec2023; and Samir Kajosevic, “Montenegro War Victims Legislation Criticised as ‘Discriminatory,’” *BIRN*, 10 May 2023, bit.ly/BIRN10May2023.

¹⁹⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024.

¹⁹⁹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, p. 48, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024.

In Afghanistan, the international community has largely suspended its support to government institutions since the Taliban took power in August 2021. In February 2023, the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) resumed coordinating mine action in the country.²⁰⁰

In South Sudan, in accordance with the 2023 National Mine Action Authority Act, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) will eventually assume full responsibility for all mine action activities. However, while the act established structures and responsibilities for the NMAA, it does not provide legislation for operational aspects.²⁰¹ UNMAS plays an important support role, particularly in terms of the oversight of information management, which has enabled the NMAA to meet its reporting obligations under relevant international treaties.²⁰²



Mines Advisory Group (MAG) uses mechanical assets to conduct technical survey in Mount Lebanon governorate in Lebanon.

© MAG, August 2023

Action 19 of the Lausanne Action Plan requires States Parties to develop evidence-based, costed, and time-bound national strategies and workplans as part of their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 commitments. As of the end of 2023, nine States Parties—Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan—had a mine action strategy or strategic plan in place, although the plans of Chad, Mauritania, and Somalia lacked the required depth of information. Chile included a workplan for clearance for 2023–2026 in its Article 4 extension request.²⁰³ Germany had a workplan in place for its first extension period through 2025, and the second extension request through 2030.²⁰⁴

In Afghanistan, a national mine action strategy for 2022–2026 was drafted but is still awaiting approval due to political changes. A new mine action strategic framework was expected to be developed in 2024.²⁰⁵

Chad did not submit a detailed workplan for non-technical survey in Tibesti province in its first Article 4 extension request submitted in April 2022.²⁰⁶ States Parties granted the extension until 1 October 2024 on the expectation that a detailed workplan and budget would be provided in a subsequent extension request if cluster munition remnant contamination is discovered.²⁰⁷ In January 2024, Chad submitted its second extension request which, again, did not include a sufficiently comprehensible and detailed workplan for the requested extension period.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁰ DMAC, “Good News,” undated, bit.ly/AfghanistanDMAC; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

²⁰¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 15 April 2024.

²⁰² UNMAS, “South Sudan,” undated, bit.ly/UNMASSouthSudan2024.

²⁰³ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 May 2022, pp. 15–20, bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022.

²⁰⁴ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 15 January 2019, p. 37, bit.ly/GermanyCCMArt4ExtRequest2019; and Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 10 May 2024, p. 56, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024.

²⁰⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

²⁰⁶ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2022, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequestMay2022.

²⁰⁷ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Tenth Meeting of States Parties,” 19 September 2022, p. 4, bit.ly/CCM10MSPFinalReport.

²⁰⁸ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, p. 12, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024.

Iraq has a national mine action strategy in place for 2022–2028.²⁰⁹

In Lao PDR, the national “Safe Path Forward III” strategy was updated for the period 2021–2030, and endorsed in July 2022.²¹⁰ The NRA developed a new multi-year workplan for the mine action sector covering 2022–2026.²¹¹

Lebanon has a Mine Action Program Strategy in place for 2020–2025.²¹²

Mauritania reported in March 2023 that it has a workplan in place for 2023–2026.²¹³ In May 2024, it reported that a national mine action strategy is in place but provided no further details.²¹⁴

Somalia has a workplan in place for 2022–2027.²¹⁵ However, the plan was developed in support of fulfillment of Mine Ban Treaty obligations and does not mention any plans to address contamination from cluster munitions. Somalia reported its intention to develop and implement a nationwide survey plan but did not provide an update as of 1 August 2024.²¹⁶

South Sudan has a national mine action strategy for 2024–2028 in place.²¹⁷

In line with Action 20 of the Lausanne Action Plan, two States Parties that submitted Article 4 deadline extension requests in 2023—Iraq and Mauritania—were required to provide an annual workplan that includes projections of the amount of cluster munition contaminated land to be addressed per year.

Upon the feedback of the Article 4 Analysis Group, Iraq submitted in April 2023 an updated version of its extension request, including a detailed workplan for 2024–2028.²¹⁸

Mauritania included a workplan in its Article 4 extension request to be granted an additional two years through 1 August 2026.²¹⁹ However, in granting the request in September 2023, the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties noted that a more detailed and costed workplan for survey, clearance, and risk education would make the plan easier to monitor progress toward implementation.²²⁰ As of 1 August 2024, Mauritania had not provided a more detailed and costed workplan.

²⁰⁹ Republic of Iraq, “Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028,” 9 August 2023, bit.ly/IraqStrategy2023-2028.

²¹⁰ Lao PDR, “The Safe Path Forward III: National Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2021–2030,” January 2023, bit.ly/LaoPDRSafePathForwardIII; NRA, “Minutes: First UXO Sector Working Group Meeting 2022,” 16 September 2022, p. 4, bit.ly/NRAMeeting16Sept2022; UNDP, “Background paper for UXO donor and media field visit,” 31 March–2 April 2021; and statement of Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2022, bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement16June2022.

²¹¹ UNDP, “Synthesis Report (2019–2022): Support for the Institutional Strengthening of the National Regulatory Authority for the UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR,” 30 June 2022, p. 14, bit.ly/UNDP_LaoPDR30June2022.

²¹² LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Program Strategy 2020–2025,” undated, bit.ly/LebanonMineAction2020-2025.

²¹³ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, pp. 13 and 17, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023.

²¹⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

²¹⁵ Federal Republic of Somalia, “Workplan for the period from October 2022 to October 2027,” 30 April 2023, bit.ly/SomaliaWorkplan2022-2027.

²¹⁶ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F, pp. 6–7.

²¹⁷ Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028,” 2 April 2024, bit.ly/SouthSudanStrategy2024-2028.

²¹⁸ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Extension requests to be considered at the 11th Meeting of States Parties (11MSP),” undated, bit.ly/CCMExtensionRequests11MSP.

²¹⁹ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 17, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023.

²²⁰ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final report of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties,” 29 September 2023, p. 4, www.undocs.org/en/CCM/MSP/2023/11.

RISK EDUCATION

All States Parties with cluster munition contamination have a risk education mechanism in place except Chile and Germany, where the contaminated areas are inaccessible to the public.²²¹

Action 27 of the Lausanne Action Plan requires that States Parties develop national strategies and workplans to carry out risk education, drawing on best practices and standards.

Risk education is included in the national mine action strategies or strategic plans of Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan, however, the plans of Chad, Mauritania, and Somalia lack the required detail.

As part of their operational planning, States Parties should also include detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for risk education in their Article 4 clearance deadline extension requests. In its Article 4 extension request submitted in 2023, Iraq provided a plan for the distribution of risk education materials, and a multi-year workplan including a budget for 2024–2039.²²² Mauritania's extension request included a budget for risk education but did not include a detailed workplan.²²³

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

States Parties with responsibility for cluster munition victims are obliged under the Convention on Cluster Munitions to develop a national plan and budget for victim assistance. Action 33 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits states to designate a national focal point, and to address the needs and rights of victims according to a measurable national plan. In 2023, all States Parties with victims had a victim assistance focal point except Croatia and Sierra Leone.

Five of the 14 States Parties with obligations to assist cluster munition victims – Croatia, Mauritania, Montenegro, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan – did not have an active strategy or draft plan on victim assistance in 2023. However, South Sudan indicated that it is planning to develop a national disability strategy that would cover victim assistance.²²⁴

STANDARDS

LAND RELEASE AND RISK EDUCATION

In 2023, States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan all had national land release and risk education standards in place that

²²¹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, p. 23; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024. In Chile, the Ministry of National Defense, Department for the Implementation of International Conventions on Explosive Remnants of War (Departamento de Implementación de Convenciones sobre Restos de Explosivos de Guerra, DICOR) and the Training Center for Demining and Destruction of Explosives (Centro de Entrenamiento en Desminado y Destrucción de Explosivos, CEDDEX) are responsible for risk education activities and coordinate with the Ministry of Education in the regions of Arica and Parinacota, Magallanes and Antártica Chilena, and Tarapacá. Although a basic coordination mechanism with identified responsibilities is in place, Chile has not reported the implementation and coordination of any activities in 2023.

²²² Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 11 April 2023, p. 43, bit.ly/IraqCCMArt4ExtRequest2023R, and Annex B, pp. 11–13, bit.ly/IraqExtRequestAnnexB2023.

²²³ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, pp. 13 and 17, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023.

²²⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 25 April 2024.

were in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).²²⁵ Chile uses IMAS along with a Joint Demining Manual for its armed forces, while clearance and survey in Germany are conducted according to federal legislation.²²⁶

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Under Action 32 of the Lausanne Action Plan, States Parties committed to consider IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance when integrating victim assistance into broader strategies and plans. IMAS 13.10 reminds all actors that victim assistance is to be implemented as an equal pillar of mine action, and that the mine action sector is responsible for providing assistance or facilitating access to services. National mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisectoral efforts to address the needs of cluster munition survivors. National authorities should also assist with including survivors and indirect victims of cluster munitions, as well as their views, in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. IMAS 13.10 notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.

In 2023, Iraq became the first country to fully adapt IMAS 13.10 as a set of national standards. Iraq's National Standard on Victim Assistance in Mine Action were developed with the support of HI and adopted by both the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).²²⁷ It was reported that Lao PDR and Lebanon are working to update their respective national victim assistance standards in line with IMAS 13.10.²²⁸

REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties with cluster munition contamination must report annually on the location and size of areas under their jurisdiction or control that are contaminated by cluster munition remnants, as well as on progress in clearance and the destruction of cluster munition remnants. States Parties must submit an updated transparency report by 30 April each year.

²²⁵ The International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) framework is a set of standards, guidelines, and technical notes developed by the UN together with global mine action sector representatives to ensure that activities are carried out safely and effectively. See, DMAC, "AMAS," undated, www.dmac.gov.af/amas; Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024; Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form A, p. 14; NRA, "National Standard," undated, bit.ly/NRAStandards; LMAC, "NMAS," undated, bit.ly/LMACStandards; Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F, p. 18; Mauritania response to Observations and Comments of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Analysis Group, 27 July 2021, bit.ly/MauritaniaResponse27July2021; response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD and MIDEK, 21 March 2022; Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Workplan (revised), 2 June 2023, pp. 26–31, bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 25 April 2024.

²²⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 May 2024; and Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Construction, and Nuclear Safety, and Federal Ministry of Defence, "Working Guidelines for Clearance of Explosive Ordnance," July 2014, bit.ly/GermanyClearanceGuidelines2014.

²²⁷ HI, "Towards an effective implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan: operationalizing International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance in Mine Action: the case of Iraq," side event, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 September 2023.

²²⁸ LMAC, NMAS 13.10 Mine Victim Assistance March 2020 Edition 2.1, bit.ly/LMACStandardsVA; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for the Mine Ban Treaty, DMA, 10 March 2022; by Reinier Carabain, Operations Manager, HI Lao PDR, 14 June 2021; by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2022; and by Col. Mansour Shtay, Victim Assistance Section Head, LMAC, 21 February 2022.

As of 1 August 2024, all States Parties with clearance obligations submitted updated Article 7 reports covering calendar year 2023 except Somalia.

States Parties also have an obligation to report on risk education.²²⁹ Action 29 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to provide data on risk education beneficiaries disaggregated by gender, age, and disability in their transparency reports. In 2023, Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, and Lebanon submitted Article 7 reports that included beneficiary data disaggregated by gender and age. However, no States Parties reported if, or how many, persons with disabilities were amongst the annual beneficiaries.


Lao PDR did not provide a comprehensive summary of all risk education activities and only disaggregated the data by gender in the total of all beneficiaries, while Chad and Mauritania did not provide any beneficiary data.²³⁰

As of 1 August 2024, among States Parties with responsibility for cluster munition victims, Somalia had not submitted its annual updated report covering activities in 2023, while Sierra Leone last submitted an annual update in 2011. Croatia did not provide substantial victim assistance updates for calendar year 2023, but referred to services and activities undertaken in 2021 and 2022.

²²⁹ Reporting on “measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control” is allocated to Form H of the Article 7 transparency report.

²³⁰ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, p. 5; Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, pp. 17–18; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form G, p. 17.

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION



MAP KEY


- Massive contamination (more than 1,000km²)
- Large contamination (100–1,000km²)
- Medium contamination (10–99km²)
- Small contamination (less than 10km²)
- Extent of contamination unknown
- Clearance reported complete

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, **signatories** are underlined, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES



MAP KEY

Cluster munition casualties recorded prior to 2023

Casualties recorded from cluster munitions in 2023

No recorded cluster munition casualties

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, signatories are underlined, non-signatories are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.



A Danish Refugee Council staff member provides explosive ordnance risk education in Alkremia near Tripoli, Libya.

© Tameem Eldeeb/Danish Refugee Council, June 2023

STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 15, the convention was open for signature from 3 December 2008 until its entry into force on 1 August 2010. Since the convention's entry into force, states may no longer sign—rather they may become bound through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16(2), the convention is open for accession by any state that has not signed. In the following list of states, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Accession is indicated with (a).

As of 1 August 2024 there were 112 States Parties and 12 signatories.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 3 Dec 08; 8 Sep 11	Burkina Faso 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
Albania 3 Dec 08; 16 Jun 09	Burundi 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
Andorra 9 Apr 13 (a)	Cameroon 15 Dec 09; 12 Jul 12
Antigua and Barbuda 16 Jul 10; 23 Aug 10	Canada 3 Dec 08; 16 Mar 15
Australia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 12	Cabo Verde 3 Dec 08; 19 Oct 10
Austria 3 Dec 08; 2 Apr 09	Chad 3 Dec 08; 26 Mar 13
Belgium 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09	Chile 3 Dec 08; 16 Dec 10
Belize 2 Sep 14 (a)	Colombia 3 Dec 08; 10 Sep 15
Benin 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 17	Comoros 3 Dec 08; 28 Jul 10
Bolivia 3 Dec 08; 30 Apr 13	Congo, Rep. 3 Dec 08; 2 Sep 14
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 08; 7 Sep 10	Cook Islands 3 Dec 08; 23 Aug 11
Botswana 3 Dec 08; 27 Jun 11	Costa Rica 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 11
Bulgaria 3 Dec 08; 6 Apr 11	Côte d'Ivoire 4 Dec 08; 12 Mar 12
	Croatia 3 Dec 08; 17 Aug 09

Cuba 6 Apr 16 (a)
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 08; 22 Sep 11
 Denmark 3 Dec 08; 12 Feb 10
 Dominican Republic 10 Nov 09;
 20 Dec 11
 Ecuador 3 Dec 08; 11 May 10
 El Salvador 3 Dec 08; 10 Jan 11
 Eswatini 13 Sep 11 (a)
 Fiji 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
 France 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
 Gambia 3 Dec 08; 11 Dec 18
 Germany 3 Dec 08; 8 Jul 09
 Ghana 3 Dec 08; 3 Feb 11
 Grenada 29 Jun 11 (a)
 Guatemala 3 Dec 08; 3 Nov 10
 Guinea 3 Dec 08; 21 Oct 14
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
 Guyana 31 Oct 14 (a)
 Holy See 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Honduras 3 Dec 08; 21 Mar 12
 Hungary 3 Dec 08; 3 Jul 12
 Iceland 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 15
 Iraq 12 Nov 09; 14 May 13
 Ireland 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Italy 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 11
 Japan 3 Dec 08; 14 Jul 09
 Lao PDR 3 Dec 08; 18 Mar 09
 Lebanon 3 Dec 08; 5 Nov 10
 Lesotho 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 08; 4 Mar 13
 Lithuania 3 Dec 08; 24 Mar 11
 Luxembourg 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
 Madagascar 3 Dec 08; 20 May 17
 Malawi 3 Dec 08; 7 Oct 09
 Maldives 27 Sep 19 (a)
 Mali 3 Dec 08; 30 Jun 10
 Malta 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
 Mauritania 19 Apr 10; 1 Feb 12
 Mauritius 1 Oct 15 (a)
 Mexico 3 Dec 08; 6 May 09
 Moldova 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
 Monaco 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 10
 Montenegro 3 Dec 08; 25 Jan 10
 Mozambique 3 Dec 08; 14 Mar 11
 Namibia 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 18
 Nauru 3 Dec 08; 4 Feb 13
 Netherlands 3 Dec 08; 23 Feb 11
 New Zealand 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09
 Nicaragua 3 Dec 08; 2 Nov 09
 Niger 3 Dec 08; 2 Jun 09
 Nigeria 12 Jun 09; 28 Feb 23
 Niue 6 Aug 20 (a)
 North Macedonia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 09
 Norway 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Palau 3 Dec 08; 19 Apr 16
 Palestine 2 Jan 15 (a)
 Panama 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
 Paraguay 3 Dec 08; 12 Mar 15
 Peru 3 Dec 08; 26 Sep 12
 Philippines 3 Dec 08; 3 Jan 19
 Portugal 3 Dec 08; 9 Mar 11
 Rwanda 3 Dec 08; 25 Aug 15
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 13 Sep 13 (a)
 Saint Lucia 15 Sep 20 (a)
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
 23 Sep 09; 29 Oct 10
 Samoa 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 10
 San Marino 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
 São Tomé and Príncipe 3 Dec 08; 27 Jan 20
 Senegal 3 Dec 08; 3 Aug 11
 Seychelles 13 Apr 10; 20 May 10
 Sierra Leone 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Slovakia 24 Jul 15 (a)
 Slovenia 3 Dec 08; 19 Aug 09
 Somalia 3 Dec 08; 30 Sep 15
 South Africa 3 Dec 08; 28 May 15
 South Sudan 3 Aug 23 (a)
 Spain 3 Dec 08; 17 Jun 09
 Sri Lanka 1 Mar 2018 (a)
 Sweden 3 Dec 08; 23 Apr 12
 Switzerland 3 Dec 08; 17 Jul 12
 Togo 3 Dec 08; 22 Jun 12
 Trinidad and Tobago 21 Sep 11 (a)
 Tunisia 12 Jan 09; 28 Sep 10
 United Kingdom 3 Dec 08; 4 May 10
 Uruguay 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
 Zambia 3 Dec 08; 12 Aug 09

SIGNATORIES

Angola	3 Dec 08	Indonesia	3 Dec 08
Central African Republic	3 Dec 08	Jamaica	12 Jun 09
Congo, Dem. Rep.	18 Mar 09	Kenya	3 Dec 08
Cyprus	23 Sep 09	Liberia	3 Dec 08
Djibouti	30 Jul 10	Tanzania	3 Dec 08
Haiti	28 Oct 09	Uganda	3 Dec 08

NON-SIGNATORIES

Algeria	Marshall Islands
Argentina	Micronesia, Federated States
Armenia	Mongolia
Azerbaijan	Morocco
Bahamas	Myanmar/Burma
Bahrain	Nepal
Bangladesh	Oman
Barbados	Pakistan
Belarus	Papua New Guinea
Bhutan	Poland
Brazil	Qatar
Brunei Darussalam	Romania
Cambodia	Russia
China	Saudi Arabia
Dominica	Serbia
Egypt	Singapore
Equatorial Guinea	Solomon Islands
Eritrea	Sudan
Estonia	Suriname
Ethiopia	Syria
Finland	Tajikistan
Gabon	Thailand
Georgia	Timor-Leste
Greece	Tonga
India	Türkiye
Iran	Turkmenistan
Israel	Tuvalu
Jordan	Ukraine
Kazakhstan	United Arab Emirates
Kiribati	United States
Korea, North	Uzbekistan
Korea, South	Vanuatu
Kuwait	Venezuela
Kyrgyzstan	Vietnam
Latvia	Yemen
Libya	Zimbabwe
Malaysia	

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DUBLIN 19-30 MAY 2008

CCM/77

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict,

Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned,

Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use,

Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles of cluster munitions retained for operational use and *determined* to ensure their rapid destruction,

Believing it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated manner to resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the world, and to ensure their destruction,

Determined also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and *recognising* their inherent dignity,

Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as providing for their social and economic inclusion,

Recognising the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups,

Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, *inter alia*, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability,

Mindful of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and *resolved* to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons,

Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,

Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party to this Convention,

Welcoming the very broad international support for the international norm prohibiting anti-personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,

Welcoming also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and *wishing* to enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in post-conflict environments,

Bearing in mind also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 on children in armed conflict,

Welcoming further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent years aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions and *recognising* the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,

Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which, *inter alia*, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles,

Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation and its full implementation,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations against military objectives only, that in the conduct of military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations and scope of application

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
 - a. Use cluster munitions;
 - b. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
 - c. Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
3. This Convention does not apply to mines.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. “**Cluster munition victims**” means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment

of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities;

2. **“Cluster munition”** means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:
 - a. A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
 - b. A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;
 - c. A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
 - i. Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
 - ii. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
 - iii. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;
 - iv. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;
 - v. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature.
3. **“Explosive submunition”** means a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
4. **“Failed cluster munition”** means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;
5. **“Unexploded submunition”** means an explosive submunition that has been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has failed to explode as intended;
6. **“Abandoned cluster munitions”** means cluster munitions or explosive submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been prepared for use;
7. **“Cluster munition remnants”** means failed cluster munitions, abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets;
8. **“Transfer”** involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster munition remnants;
9. **“Self-destruction mechanism”** means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated;
10. **“Self-deactivating”** means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition;
11. **“Cluster munition contaminated area”** means an area known or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants;
12. **“Mine”** means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle;
13. **“Explosive bomblet”** means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order to perform its task, is dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
14. **“Dispenser”** means a container that is designed to disperse or release explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of dispersal or release;
15. **“Unexploded bomblet”** means an explosive bomblet that has been dispersed, released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has failed to explode as intended.

ARTICLE 3

Storage and stockpile destruction

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Each request for an extension shall set out:
 - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b. A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional circumstances justifying it;
 - c. A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;
 - d. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions held at the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions discovered after such entry into force;
 - e. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; and
 - f. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions remaining to be destroyed during the proposed extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved.
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be considered.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in cluster munition and explosive submunition detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted.
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year.

ARTICLE 4

Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education

1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
 - a. Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date;
 - b. Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
 - c. Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance:
 - a. Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - b. Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies;
 - c. Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
 - d. Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
 - e. Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.
3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
 - a. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, *inter alia*, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.

- b. Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to be considered. Each request shall set out:
 - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to and required by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants during the proposed extension;
 - c. The preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any subsequent extensions;
 - d. The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force;
 - e. The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of this Convention;
 - f. The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension;
 - g. The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability during the proposed extension;
 - h. The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension; and
 - i. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate.

Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 5

Victim assistance

1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall:
 - a. Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
 - b. Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies;
 - c. Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors;
 - d. Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;
 - e. Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs;
 - f. Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations;
 - g. Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and
 - h. Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.

ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance.
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and information concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide assistance to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of marking, risk reduction education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected State Party.
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis.
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected States Parties.

9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article.
10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this Convention, including facilitation of the entry and exit of personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration international best practices.
11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, request the United Nations system, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions to assist its authorities to determine, inter alia:
 - a. The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - b. The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the plan;
 - c. The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - d. Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition remnants;
 - e. Assistance to cluster munition victims; and
 - f. The coordination relationship between the government of the State Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the plan.
12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.

ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on:
 - a. The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this Convention;
 - b. The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type;
 - c. The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced by that State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by it, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants;
 - d. The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions;
 - e. The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
 - f. The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards observed;
 - g. Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their destruction in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention;

- h. To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were used;
 - i. The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this Convention, to include the size and location of the cluster munition contaminated area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant cleared and destroyed;
 - j. The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - k. The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender- sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims;
 - l. The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide information and to carry out the measures described in this paragraph;
 - m. The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Convention; and
 - n. The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation and assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention.
2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
 3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information that would assist in clarifying the matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine, the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means further

to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention.

6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such other general procedures or specific mechanisms for clarification of compliance, including facts, and resolution of instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate.

ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of States Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a. The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b. Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c. International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;
 - d. The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;
 - e. Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and
 - f. Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
 - a. To review the operation and status of this Convention;
 - b. To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this Convention; and
 - c. To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to all States.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties that have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances by a majority of the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs and administrative tasks

1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is subject to an appropriate United Nations mandate.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature at Oslo by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force for that State.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

ARTICLE 21

Relations with States not Party to this Convention

1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
 - a. To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
 - b. To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
 - c. To itself use cluster munitions; or
 - d. To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.

ARTICLE 22

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 23

Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention shall be equally authentic.

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2024



Cluster Munition Monitor 2024 examines how states are working to join and implement the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons. Using the Convention on Cluster Munitions as its principal frame of reference, the report focuses on calendar year 2023 with information included up to August 2024 where possible. It covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally, and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and the needs of survivors through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Profiles published online provide additional country-specific findings on these topics.

This report was prepared by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

Front Cover: AO-15Ch submunitions are prepared for destruction in Pisco, Peru. Peru completed the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions on 15 December 2023. © Santiago Ocampo/Norwegian People's Aid, December 2023

Top left: At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Geneva, Mine Action Fellows remind delegates that there is no room for cluster munitions in the future they are building. © Mines Action Canada, September 2023

Top right: A deminer measures an M77 submunition found during a UXO spot task in the district of Sinjar in Iraq's Ninewa governorate. © HAMAP-Humanitaire, June 2024

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